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I N T R O D U C T I O N 
Hannah Bruesewitz was bom on October 20, 1991. Her pediatrician 
administered doses of the [diphtheria, pertussis, and tetanus (DTP)] vaccine 
according to the Center for Disease Control's recommended childhood 
immunization schedule. Within 24 hours of her April 1992 vaccination, 
Hannah started to experience seizures. She suffered over 100 seizures during 
the next month, and her doctors eventually diagnosed her with "residual 
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seizure disorder" and "developmental delay." Hannah, now a teenager, is 
still diagnosed with both conditions.' 
In 1995, Hannah Bruesewitz's parents embarked on an unsuccessful 
fifteen-year odyssey through the courts. Claiming that Hannah suffered 
vaccine-related injuries for which she was entided to compensation, her 
parents litigated her case in every available forum, culminating in their 
recent loss in the U . S . Supreme Court.2 Hannah's parents first sought 
compensation, as they were required to do, under the National Childhood 
Vaccine Injury Act (Vaccine Act),3 a pioneering no-fault federal tort reform 
law that took effect two decades ago. The statute, preempting state product 
hability laws, mandates that all claims for compensation for injuries caused 
by the vaccines routinely given in die United States must first be brought 
and litigated in die U . S . Court of Federal Claims, with the Secretary of 
Health and Human Services (HHS) as the respondent.* After exhausting 
this remedy, petitioners have the option of filing a civil action in state or 
federal court, on grounds not foreclosed by the Vaccine Act, against the 
manufacturer of the vaccine or the healthcare provider who administered 
it.5 
After the Court of Federal Claims rejected Hannah's parents' petition 
for compensation, her parents filed a civil tort suit against the vaccine's 
manufacturer. 6 The complaint was dismissed in large part by the District 
Court, which held that the Vaccine Act's preemption clause forbids a claim 
against a vaccine manufacturer based upon a design defect, which was 
Hannah's parents' most promising remaining ground for relief. ^  O n 
February 22, 2011, the U . S . Supreme Court affirmed the dismissal.s 
Hannah's case highUghts a number of problems with the National 
Vaccine Injury Compensation Program (Vaccine Program or Vaccine 
Compensation Program)^ today. The program represented a legislative 
compromise involving the major interest groups working in the vaccine 
area, including vaccine manufacturers, physicians' groups, healthcare 
providers, federal health agencies, and parent groups advocating on behalf 
1. Bruesewitz v. Wyeth L . L . C , 131 S. Ct. 1068, 1074-75 (2011) (footnotes omitted). 
2. Id. at 1082. 
3. National Childhood Vaccine Injury Act (Vaccine Act) of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-660, 
100 Stat. 3755 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 300aa-l to -34 (2006)). 
4. 42 U.S.C. §300aa-l 1(a)(1) to (4) (2006). 
5. « . §300aa-21(a). 
6. Bruesewitz, 131 S. Ct. at 1075. 
7. Id. 
8. U. at 1082. 
9. 42 U.S.C. § 300aa-10. 
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of injured children.'o Now that die Vaccine Program has been operating 
for more than twenty years, we can reach several broad conclusions about 
its successes and failures in satisfying the objectives of these groups and the 
objectives of the legislation. First, it appears that die Program has been 
largely successful in providing excellent liability protection for the 
pharmaceutical industry that makes vaccines, as well as for the doctors and 
odier healthcare providers who administer them. These groups have been 
extremely concerned about possible tort liability for alleged vaccine-related 
injuries." While the Vaccine Act has not entirely eliminated all potential 
tort liabihty for manufacturers and healthcare providers, it has significantly 
minimized such liability, particularly after Bruesewitz v. Wyeth}"^ The 
interests of the federal health agencies involved in the vaccine area, 
including H H S , the Centers for Disease Control ( C D C ) , the Food and 
Drug Administration (FDA), and several other agencies, have also been 
largely satisfied by ensuring a relatively constant supply of vaccines to the 
public and ensuring that a high number of Americans receive 
inoculations. 13 However, the objectives of parents' groups and other 
advocates for children and adults who have suffered serious injuries after 
receiving vaccines have not been satisfied. For persons who may have been 
injured by vaccinations, the need for expeditious, generous, and predictable 
compensation remains unmet. Moreover, the process of adjudicating 
vaccine cases today is seriously flawed and in need of repair. 
In this Article, I will examine the process of htigating vaccine injury 
claims in the Vaccine Compensation Program. The adjudicative process 
has changed over time, such that the program has become much different 
today than it was when the law was first enacted. The Vaccine 
Compensation Program is also very different from the program that the 
10. Denis J . Haupdy & Mary Mason, The National Childhood Vaccine Injury Act: The Federal 
No-Fault Compensation Program that Gives a Boosterfor Tort Reform, 37 FED. B. NEWS & J . 452, 452 
(1990); Lainie Rutkow et al., Balancing Consumer and Industry Interests in Public Health: The 
National Vaccine Injury Compensation Program and Its Influence During the Last Two Decades, 111 
P E N N S T . L . R E V . 681, 711-12 (2007). 
11. Prior to the passage of the Vaccine Act, the persistent threat of tort liability claims 
caused pharmaceutical companies to consider and threaten to abandon the vaccine market, 
and some had already done so. There was real concern that there might be no 
manufacturers for certain vaccines in the United States. H.R. REP. N o . 99-908, pt. 1, at 6-
7 (1986), reprinted in 1986 U . S . C . C . A . N . 6344, 6347-48. 
12. 131 S. Ct. 1068(2011). 
13. See Walter A . Orenstein et al.. Immunizations in the United States: Success, Structure, and 
Stress, 24 HEALTH A F F . 599, 599-60 (2005) (highlighting the correlation between record 
highs of immunization levels among young children and the reduction of disease incidence); 
cf. Rutkow et al., supra note 10, at 717-18 (describing the program as a "moderate success" 
that has "succeeded in reducing the number of lawsuits brought under the tort system"). 
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Supreme Court described in Bruesewitz. In the Bruesewitz opinion, the 
Supreme Court characterized the underlying proceedings before the special 
masters as involving "informal adjudication" which moves quickly to final 
resolution within 240 days of fiUng "except for two limited exceptions."'* 
The Court added: "Fast, informal adjudication is made possible by the 
Act's Vaccine Injury Table "'5 
These descriptions of the Vaccine Program would have been largely 
accurate when the Act was initially passed, but diey are substantially 
inaccurate in describing how the program actually operates today. The 
adjudications today are typically not informal at all, virtually no cases are 
concluded widiin the 240-day deadhne, and the Vaccine Injury Table,'6 
which was originally a central feature of die Vaccine Act and a key 
innovative provision of die Act , has been significandy changed and 
narrowed over the years so diat today it plays only a hmited role in Vaccine 
Act cases.'^ 
The Vaccine Injury Table Hsts the specific injuries that the court 
recognizes as presumptively caused by a vaccine and the specified time limit 
for the occurrence of the onset of each listed injury.'s When die Vaccine 
14. Bruesewitz, 131 S. Ct. at 1073. 
15. Id. 
16. 42 U.S.C. §300aa-14(a) (2006). 
17. See infra notes 72-74 and accompanying text; see also Stevens v. Sec'y of the Dep't of 
Health & Human Servs., No. 99-594V, 2001 W L 387418, at *8 (Fed. C l . Mar. 30, 2001) 
abrogated in part bj Mihen v. Sec'y of Health & Human Servs., 418 F.3d 1274 1281 (Fed Cir 
2005). \ • • 
18. The Vaccine Injury Table lists Table injuries as foUows (partial list of vaccines): 
Vaccine Adverse Event Time Interval 
Measles, mumps and 
rubella virus-containing 
vaccine in any combination 
(e.g., M M R , M R , M , R) 
Anaphylaxis or anaphylactic shock 
Encephalopathy (or encephalitis) 
Any acute complication or sequela 





vaccines (e.g., DTaP, Tdap, 
DTP-Hib , D T , Td , TT) 
Anaphylaxis or anaphylactic shock 
Brachial neuritis 
Any acute complication or sequela 




Varicella vaccine No condition specified for 
compensation 
Not applicable 





No condition specified for 
compensation 
Not appUcable 
HiiALTH R E S . & S E R V S . A D M I N , N A T I O N A L C H I L D H O O D V A C C I N E I N I U R Y A C T : V A C C I N E 
INJURY T A B L E (2008), http://www.hrsa.gov/vaccinecompensation/pdfs-do-not-use/ 
vaccineinjurytable.pdf Updates to the Vaccine Injury Table are also codified in the Code of 
Federal Regulations. See, e.g, 42 C . F . R . § 100.3 (2010). 
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Program began, the overwhelming majority of cases that were htigated in 
the program involved the relatively simple question of whether the Table 
requirements had been satisfied. i9 However, die siUiation today, and for 
the foreseeable future, is die reverse. The overwhelming majority of cases 
hugated m the program do not involve Table injuries. In these cases, 
petitioners are asserting only non-Table claims and must prove that the 
vaccine caused the injury. 
There are a number of reasons for this, but the most important is that 
the Table was substantially modified and narrowed by the Secretary of 
H H S m 1995 dirough an administrative rulemaking proceeding.2o In 
addition, the nine vaccines added to the Table by the Secretary of H H S 
since 1988 generaUy have no specified Table injuries at all or have the 
immediate onset of anaphylactic shock as the only hsted Table injury.2i 
These changes in the Table have resulted i n other major changes in the 
operation of the program. The cases are now substantiaUy more difficult, 
complex, and time-consuming to Utigate. The science is less clear, and die 
special masters have much more difficult and complex scientific disputes to 
resolve than they did for the relatively simpler Table injury claims. Both 
pentioners' counsel and government counsel now need to search for experts 
m cutting-edge medical areas, such as genetics and neurology, where a 
great deal of uncertainty stiU exists. This contributes to a much more 
adversarial process than was supposed to exist in a program that was 
designed to be less adversarial. 
The present focus of the Vaccine Program on virtually aU off-Table cases 
has also resulted in a series of recent decisions f rom die U . S . Court of 
19. The Vaccine Compensation Program's former Chief Special Master, Gary J 
Golkiewicz, descnbed how substantially the program had been changed by the 1995 Health 
and Human Services (HHS) Table changes: 
With the enactment of the administrative Table amendments, effective Mar 10 
1995, there was a dramatic shift in the percentage of cases decided pursuant to the 
table versus those decided under an actual causation theory. While possessing no 
empincaJ data, experience and anecdotal evidence suggests that the percentages flip-
tlopped; pnor to the amendments 90% of cases were Table cases, while after the 
amendments 90% of cases were actual causation cases. In fact, the undersigned has 
yet to adjudicate a case involving the interpretation of the amended Table; aU 
litigated claims have been causation cases. 
Stevens, 2m W L 387418, at*8. 
nr ^""^""^ Compensation Program Revision of the Vaccine Injury 
Table, 60 Fed. Reg. 7678, 7694 (Feb. 8, 1995) (codified at 42 C.F.R. § 100.3 (2011)). 
21. The most recendy added vaccines, which have no listed Table injuries, are die 
H P V vaccine, added in 2007; the seasonal flu vaccines, added in 2005; and the Hepatitis A 
vaccine, added in 2004. The only Table injury for several other vaccines, including the 
inactivated poho vaccine and the Hepatitis B vaccine, is anaphylactic shock within zero to 
tour hours of receipt of the vaccine. See H E A L T H R E S . & S E R V S . A D M I N , supra note 18 
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Appeals- for the Federal Circuit, purportedly clarifying but sometimes 
confusing the standards that the special masters are required to apply in 
deciding off-Table cases. A number of the Federal Circuit's recent rulings 
have observed that Congress intended compensation to be provided 
generously, and that "close calls regarding causation are [to be] resolved in 
favor of injured claimants. "22 T o the contrary, odier recent Federal Circuit 
ruhngs have emphasized the importance of strict compUance with 
traditional tort standards of causation.23 Such inconsistencies have 
illuminated the need for clear standards. 
In this Article, I seek to evaluate what the Vaccine Compensation 
Program has accomphshed and what it has not, assessing its evolution over 
the past two decades. I wi l l also undertake a comparative assessment, 
evaluating the Vaccine Compensation Program in hght of the experiences 
of other federal compensation programs that Congress has recendy 
adopted. 
Part I of this Article provides a brief history of the Vaccine Act and 
describes how the Act created a blend of inquisitorial and adversarial 
features for litigating vaccine cases. It then describes a number of the 
Vaccine Program's procedural and case management innovations. It also 
describes the major changes that have occurred in the program since it 
began in 1988, and the negative consequences that some of those changes 
have had on the way the program operates today. This Part also argues 
that there are a munber of serious problems with the Vaccine 
Compensation Program that require systemic correction. 
Part II briefly describes the five other major compensation programs that 
Congress has created since the passage of the Vaccine Act, each of which 
responded to a special circumstance: the Radiation Exposure 
Compensation Program (Radiation Program),2* the Japanese-American 
internment compensation program,25 the Smallpox Compensation 
Program,26 the September 11th V ic t im Compensation Fund,27 and the 
Countermeasures Injury Compensation Program.28 
22. Andreu v. Sec'y of Health & Human Servs., 569 F.3d 1367, 1378 (Fed. Cir. 2009) 
(quoting Capizzmo v. Sec'y of Health & Human Sens., 440 F.3d 1317, 1325-26 (Fed. Cir. 2006); 
Walther v. Sec'y of Health & Human Servs., 485 F.3d 1146, 1150 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (quoting 
.4//AOT,418F.3dat 1280). 
23. See, e.g., Moberly v. Sec'y of Health & Human Servs., 592 F.3d 1315, 1322 (Fed. 
Cir. 2010), reh'gen banc denied, 380 F. App'x 142 (Fed. Cir. 2010). 
24. Radiation Exposure Compensation Act, Pub. L . No. 101-426, 104 Stat. 920 (1990) 
(codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 2210 note (2006) (Radiation Exposure Compensation)). 
25. Civil Liberties Act of 1988, Pub. L . No. 100-383, 102 Stat. 904 (codified as 
amended at 50 U.S.C. app. § 1989b (2006)). 
26. Smallpox Emergency Personnel Protection Act of 2003, Pub. L. No. 108-20, 117 
Stat. 638 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 239-239h (2006)). 
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Part I I I undertakes a comparative evaluation of these compensation 
programs. Several features of these newer programs, such as a reduced 
burden of proof for petitioners, could successfully be adopted to improve 
the Vaccine Compensation Program. Perhaps the most important lesson 
for the Vaccine Compensation Program, and for other compensation 
programs that Congress may adopt in the future, comes from the failed 
Smallpox Vaccination Program in 2002-2003, where a major reason for its 
failure was the perceived (and actual) inadequacy of its injury compensation 
plan. 
Based upon both recent developments in the Vaccine Program and 
lessons learned from the other compensation plans. Part I V argues that a 
number of legislative and other measures should be undertaken to remedy 
the problems that exist i n the Vaccine Compensation Program. 
I . T H E F L A W E D F E D E R A L V A C C I N E I N J U R Y C O M P E N S A T I O N P R O G R A M 
A. History of the Vaccine Act and Its Ke)j Provisions 
The federal vaccine injury compensation law, which took effect in 1988, 
was a pioneering example of no-fauh federal tort reform legislation.29 The 
specific provisions of the Act represented a legislative compromise among 
the major interest groups working on vaccine issues, including the vaccine 
manufacturers, physicians and healthcare groups, federal health agencies, 
and groups advocating on behalf of injured children. The compensation 
fund was part of a broader statute that also created new programs to 
increase the safety and availabihty of vaccuies and provided vaccine 
manufacturers and healthcare providers vnth legal protections against 
lawsuits involving vaccine-induced injuries.^o 
The Supreme Court i n Bruesewitz described the Vaccine Act as involving 
a quid pro quo from the vaccine manufacturers, who received substantial 
27. September 11th Victim Compensation Fund of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-42, 115 
Stat. 237 (2001) (codified as amended at 49 U.S.C. § 40101 note (2006) (Air Transportation 
Safety and System Stabilization)). 
28. Public Readiness and Emergency Preparedness Act, Pub. L. No. 109-148, 119 Stat 
2818 (2005) (codified at 42 U.S .C. § 247d-6d (2006)). 
29. Vaccine Act, Pub. L. No. 99-660, 100 Stat. 3755 (1988) (codified as amended at 42 
U.S.C. §§ 300a-1 to-34 (2006)). 
30. 42 U.S.C. § 300aa-1 (2006). Now that Bruesewitz has eUminated all potential design 
defect claims against vaccine manufacturers, remaining claims that could be brought against 
manufacturers include claims based upon fraud, wrongful withholding of information about 
the safety or effectiveness of a vaccine, and manufacturing defects. See 42 U.S.C. § 300aa-
22(b), -23(d)(2)(A) to (C); see also Bruesewitz v. Wyeth L . L . C . , 131 S. Ct. 1068, 1079-1080 
(2011) (noting that judgments about vaccine design are properly left to the Food and Drug 
Administration (FDA)). 
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liability protection in return for establishing the Vaccine Injury 
Compensation Program that the "vaccine manufacturers fund from their 
sales."31 While perhaps hterally accurate, this statement is substantially 
misleading because the manufacturers contribute no money of their own to 
the fund, instead only transferring to the Vaccine Injury Compensation 
Trust Fund the excise taxes paid by others.32 
The Vaccine Act mandates that a claim for compensation from any 
person believed to have suffered a serious reaction to one of the vaccines 
recommended almost universally in the United States must be brought first 
in the U . S . Court of Federal Claims, in Washington, D . C . Claimants must 
litigate their cases through the Court of Federal Claims^^ before seeking 
other possible legal remedies against the manufacturer of the vaccine or the 
healthcare provider who administered it.^* A claimant's petition must 
assert that the vaccine either caused an injury f rom which the petitioner did 
not previously suffer, or that the vaccine "significandy aggravated" a pre-
existing condition.35 The petition must be filed in court prior to the 
expiration of the relatively short statute of limitations contained in the 
31. Bruesewitz, 131 S. Ct. at 1080. 
32. The Vaccine Compensation Fund obtains its funding from an excise tax levied on 
each vaccine dose administered. See Deny Ridgway, No-Fault Vaccine Insurance: Lessons from tlie 
National Vaccine Injury Compensation Program, 24 J . H E A L T H FOL. POL'Y & L. 59, 62 (1999). The 
tax is paid by either the private citizen who is vaccinated or by the federal government when 
it buys vaccines for free distribution under one of the government's health and welfare 
programs. The current excise tax is $0.75 per dose for each covered vaccine; some vaccines 
are two-, three-, or four-in-one shots that are then taxed at $1.50, $2.25, and $3.00, 
respectively. CDC Vaccine Price List, C T R S . F O R DISEAS E C O N T R O L & P R E V E N T I O N (last 
updated Nov. 2, 2011), http://www.cdc.gov/vaccines/programs/vfc/cdc-vac-price-list.htm. 
33. To exhaust this remedy, the petitioner must receive a final decision on the merits 
from the special master, and then formally "reject" this decision. U.S. C T . O F FED. C L A I M S 
V A C C I N E R . 12(a)-(b). The petitioner can then file a civil action in state or federal court. 42 
U.S.C. §§ 300aa-l 1(a)(1) to (2)(A), -21(a). 
34. One of the compromises contained in the Vaccine Act made it more difficult for an 
injured person to subsequendy bring a successful tort claim against a vaccine manufacturer 
by foreclosing manufacturer liability if the injury or death was "unavoidable even though the 
vaccine was properly prepared and was accompanied by proper directions and warnings." 
42 U.S.C. § 300aa-22(b)(l). The Supreme Court held in Bruesewitz that this provision barred 
all claims based upon design defects. 131 S. Ct. at 1080. 
35. To establish a significant aggravation of a pre-existing condition, petitioner must 
show that he or she suffered a "change for the worse in a preexisting condition which results 
in markedly greater disability, pain, or illness accompanied by substantial deterioration of 
health." 42 U.S.C. § 300aa-33(4). The leading case explaining the criteria for a showing of 
significant aggravation is Whitecotton v. Secretary of Health & Human Services, 81 F.3d 1099, 
1107-08 (Fed. Cir. 1996). 
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Act—thirty-six months f rom the first manifestation of the injury or twenty-
four months from the time of death. 36 
Vaccines play a vital role in protecting the health of the population as a 
whole,3'' resulting in what is generally recognized as one of the greatest 
pubhc health successes of the past hundred years.^s However, a relatively 
small percentage of people will suffer serious adverse effects f rom vaccines 
because no vaccine can be one hundred percent safe,^^ and vaccines are 
routinely given to tens of miUions of Americans every year. Congress 
passed the Vaccine Act not only to encourage vaccination in America and 
to provide legal protection against vaccine-injury claims for vaccine 
manufacturers and healthcare providers, but also to create a safety net for 
those few who would be injured by the vaccinations so that compensation 
to injured petitioners would be provided "quickly, easily, and with certainty 
and generosity. 
Vaccinations usually begin shortiy after a baby is born, before the infant 
leaves the hospital. T h e principal mechanism for enforcing mandatory 
vaccinations in America are laws in every state and the District of 
Columbia that generally require proof of childhood immunizations prior to 
entry into school or childcare centers.*' A l l of these statutes make 
exceptions for individuals who can certify that the vaccination is likely to 
cause death or serious injury. Most states also exempt persons with 
36. 42 U.S.C. § 300aa-16(a). In a case brought by The George Washington University 
Law School Vaccine Injury Clinic, a divided panel of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 
Federal Circuit held that the statute of limitations must be strictiy applied, and was not 
subject to equitable tolling for any reason. Brice v. Sec'y of Health & Human Servs., 240 
F.3d 1367, 1373-74 (Fed. Cir. 2001), cert, denied sub mm. Brice v. Thompson, 534 U.S. 1040 
(2001). The Federal Circuit, sitting en banc, recendy overruled Brice and held that equitable 
tolling is available under the Vaccine Act in appropriate situations. See Cloer v. Sec'y of 
Health & Human Servs., No. 2009-5052, 2011 W L 3374302, at *15-18 (Fed. Cir. Aug. 5, 
2011). 
37. See H.R. R E P . N o . 99-908, pt. 1, at 4 (1986), reprinted in 1986 U . S . C . C . A . N . 6344, 
6345 ("While most of die Nation's children enjoy great benefit from immunization 
programs, a small but significant number have been gravely injured."). 
38. Rudtow et al., supra note 10, at 681 ("Vaccines are widely hailed as one of the 
greatest medical and public health accomphshments of the twentieth century."). 
39. Robert T. Chen, Safety of Vaccines, in VACCINES 1144, 1144 (Stanley A. Plotkin & 
Walter A. Orenstein eds., 3d ed. 1999); see also Terran v. Sec'y of Health & Human Servs., 
195 F.3d 1302, 1306-07 (Fed. Cir. 1999) ("Childhood vaccinations, though an important 
part of the public health program, are not without risk. Because vaccines often contain 
either killed bacteria or live but weakened viruses, they can cause serious adverse effects."). 
40. H.R. R E P . N o . 99-908, pt. 1, at 3, reprinted in 1986 U . S . C . C . A . N . 6344, 6344. 
41. Timothy J . Aspinwall, Religious Exemptions to Childhood Immunization Statutes: Reaching 
for a More Optimal Balance Between Religious Freedom and Public Health, 29 LOY. U . C H I . L J . 109, 
109 (1997); see also Vaccine Law Information, N A T ' L VACCINE iNFO. C T R . , 
http://www.nvic.org/vaccine-laws.aspx (last visited Sept. 20, 2011). 
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religious objections to vaccinations, and a minority of states exempt persons 
with moral or phUosophical objections to immunization.^ The scope of 
these exemptions, and the enforcement policies, vary substantiaUy from 
state to state .« ' 
In the Vaccine Compensation Program's early years, the overwhelming 
majority of die cases brought, and compensation awarded, involved injuries 
to children. This has changed dramatically, and in the past few years the 
majonty of cases brought, and awards made, have involved adults ** 
The procedures to be followed in adjudicating vaccine cases are set forth 
m the Vaccine Act, in the Vaccine Rules adopted by the judges of die U . S . 
Court of Federal Claims, and in the Guiddines for Practice adopted by the 
specia^ masters.^ The petition for compensation, in contrast to a complaint 
typicaUy filed in a civil case, should not be a formalistic document that 
merely tracks statutory language, but instead should be a "short and plain 
statement of the facts and the grounds for compensa t ion .« The petition 
must be accompanied by aU medical records that might possibly shed hght 
on the case, mcluding aU available prenatal and pediatric records for an 
mtant petitioner, affidavits f rom any persons who might be called to testify 
m the case, and medical expert opinions (if appropriate) f rom the medical 
experts that petitioner intends to rely upon in the case .« The respondent 
then hies a report replying to the petition, which similarly should not be a 
42. AspmwaU, supra note 41, at 109 & n. l (referring to the great majority of states 
allowing rehgious exemptions); see also Vaccine Law Information, supra note 41. In 1905 the 
U.S . Supreme Court upheld the constitutionaHty of imposing a criminal conviction for 
faihng to comply widi a mandatory vaccination law involving the smaUpox vaccine 
Jacobsonv. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11,39(1905). 
43. See Vaccine Law Information, supra note 41. 
the Offi ""r^." '"^' ^tf^^""^^ ^-^^ EvoMng Caseload of 
he Office of Special Masters (Oct. 2010) (unpublished presentation) (on file with Author) 
covenng 1995-2010); Statistics Report, H v u J R E S . & S E R V S 
http://www.hrsa.gov/vaccmecompensa^ (last visited Sept. 2o' 
2011) (covenng 1 89-2011). The principal reason for this change appears to be th 
addition of seasonal flu vaccines to the Vaccine Act in 2005, and the widespread use of these 
vaccines by adults. Id. A total of 2,713 awards have been made in the Va^cSe 
Compensation Program through September 9, 2011. Id 
at 453. " " ^ " P ^ y * '"P'" 10, 
46. U . S . C T . O F F E D . C L A I M S V A C C I N E R . 2(c)(1)(A) 
F o / ^ i " TV-^-^- ^ 3°°^^-"(^)(2) (2006); O m c E O F S P E C I A L M A S T E R S , G U I D E U N E S 
. 2 0 0 4 ^ ™ ' ' ' ^ ™ ' ' ^ ' " ' ^ ^ ^ ' ^ ' ^ ^ ^ C O M P E N S A T I O N P R O G R A M § 11(B) 
(2004) [hereinafter G U I D E L I N E S F O R P R A C T I C E ] . New Vaccine Rules, effective July 15 
2011, require aJ^  medical records to be filed electronically, after the petition fo; 
conipensaaon is filed, except for pro se cases and other special circumstances. See U.S. C T 
O F F E D . C L A I M S V A C C I N E R . 17(b)(3). >:<:^.o.^i. 
796 
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW REVIEW 1-53.4 
mere fomaBsric opp„irion to ,he pen,io„, bu, should inelude only those 
med,cal or other tssues that respondent intends ,o comes,.« ResTonden,' 
ca.srar..prIJXltlSrr:^ ^^ ^^ ^^ ^^  
B. m Vacamlnjury Table and Its Significance in the Program 
inju^ ntore hkely than noHcenr^^d sp Sifd"!^^^^^ 
48. U . S . C T . O F F E D . C L A I M S V A C C I N E R . 4(C) ' ' ~ 
49. Id. R . 4(c)(2); G U I D E L I N E S F O R P R A C T I C E , supra note 47 at s T V 
53. /</. §300aa-13(a)(l)(B). 
(2008); Davis v. Sec'y of the De^t of H e r h I H « 
55. Vaccine Ac ' , Pub. L No 99 660 ^ 2 T o n ? (2002). 
(codified as amended ;t 42 U . S . C § 300aa H(a ) ^'^' ' ' ' ' ' ^ '^ '^^ 
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these ten vaccines and nine additional vaccines that were added to the 
Table in the years since the Act was adopted.^e 
The Table was intended to play a central role in resolving cases in the 
Vaccine Program for several reasons. First, there is stiU a great deal of 
sciennfic uncertainty concerning the nature of potential vaccine-related 
mjunes. Aldiough there are a few definitive conclusions diat can be made 
about vaccine-induced injuries,^' there are many more areas where the 
illnesses or diseases are poorly understood. The relationship between die 
diseases and vaccines has not been thoroughly investigated.^a Definitive 
answers about whether a vaccine caused an injury are often impossible to 
make in a specific case.^s 
36. These vaccines are: Hepatitis A and B , H P V , seasonal flu vaccines, meningococcal, 
pneumococcal conjugate, rotavirus, and variceUa (chicken pox). H E A L T H R E S & S E R V S 
A D M I N , supra note 18. 
57. For example, the now-discontinued oral poUo vaccine caused a hmited number of 
paralytic polio cases in the United States. This vaccine used live, attenuated viruses, causing 
an estimated eight to ten cases of poUo in America each year, out of millions of doses given 
To eliminate diese injuries, the United States switched several years ago to the inactivated or 
killed poho virus vaccine, even though the kiUed vaccine was less effective in a number of 
ways. See Peter Paradiso & Peter Wright, Oral Polwmrus Vaccine Only, in OmONS F O R 
P O U O M V E U T I S V A C C I N A T I O N I N T H E U N I T E D S T A T E S : W O R K S H O P S U M M A R Y 14 16 
OCynthia J . Howe & Richard B . Johnstone eds., 1996); Frederick Robbins & Walter 
Urenstem, U.S Experience, in OPTIONS F O R PoLIOMYEUTIS V A C C I N A T I O N I N T H E U N I T E D 
STATES: W O R K S H O P S U M M A R Y , supra, at 3; PoliomyeUtis Prevention in the United States: updated 
Recommendation of the Advisory Committee on Immunization Practices (ACIPj, MORBIDITY & 
M O R T A U T Y W K L Y . R E P . , May 19, 2000, at 2. 
58 The Federal Circuit has described the vaccine injury area as "a field bereft of 
complete and direct proof of how vaccines afffect the human body." Althen v. Sec'y of 
Healdi & Human Servs., 418 F.3d 1274, 1280 (Fed. Cir. 2005). The Centers for Disease 
Control and Prevention's (CDC's) Vaccine Information Statements (VIS) acknowledge 
senous acute consequences from a number of vaccines, including the foUowing "Moderate 
Problems from die current diphtheria, tetanus, and pertussis (DTaP) vaccination: "Seizure 
(jerking or stanng) (about 1 child out of 14,000)"; "Non-stop ctying, for 3 hours or more (up 
to about 1 child out of 1,000)"; "High fever, over 105°F (about 1 child out of 16 000)" 
C T R S . F O R D I S E A S E C O N T R O L & P R E V E N T I O N , D I P H T H E R I A , T E T A N U S & PERTUSSIS 
V A C C I N E S : W H A T Y O U N E E D T O K N O W (2007). However, the VIS fail to acknowledge any 
chrome problems caused by die vaccines. For example, the C D C ' s VIS on DTaP'states 
"Several other severe problems have been reported after DTaP," including "long-term 
seizures" and "permanent brain damage." Id The VIS concludes that these problems "are 
so rare it is hard to tell if they are caused by the vaccine." Id 
59. There are generally no definitive biological markers to prove that a vaccine was the 
cause of an injury, except for rare cases like the now-discontinued Uve poHo vaccine It is 
often impossible to determine conclusively that a person suffered the onset of a disease or 
Illness as a result of a vaccine, as opposed to an iUness that was caused by odier often 
unknown reasons. The fact that an adverse event occurred after a vaccination is not in 
itself, proof that the vaccine caused the adverse event, but it is suggestive of such an effect 
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Moreover, litigation in Table cases is relatively simple. The focus in 
these cases is first on whether the injury aUeged is the injury specified in the 
Table WhUe there have been cases where medical experts disagreed on 
the nature of the injury involved in the vaccine injury claim, most ot the 
time there wil l be no substantial dispute on the nature of the mjuiy or on 
the date of onset for the claimed injury. While experts sometimes disagree 
about which symptoms represent the date of onset of the claimed mjury, in 
the sreat majority of cases tiie medical and hospitalizaUon records 
sufficiendy documem the nature of the injury and the date of its onset. 
Thus, in Table injury cases, the medical and scientific issues involving the 
nature of the injury and the onset of its first manifestation would generally 
not be expected to create serious difficulties for the resolution of cases in the 
vaccine program. In most cases it would be expected that the doctors 
would agree on the nature of the injury and its likely date of onset. Even in 
rarer cases where issues are disputed, the scientific matters requmng 
resolution by the special masters are relatively easy to decide.60 
The use of die Table is also essential to die expeditious and eflicient 
processing of vaccine injury claims. As a former special master m the 
vaccine program, Denis J . Haupdy, along with his co-author, wrote: 
- m h i s type of program only works when issues can be converted into 
formulas to a significant degree. That is, die use of the "table" to establish 
presumptive causation in vaccine cases makes it possible to handle most cases 
with minimal effort."^' 
In vaccine cases where no Table injury claim can be made the special 
masters have much more difficuh and complex issues to decide. In such 
off--Table cases, the special masters must base their decisions on medical 
opinions or pubUshed articles linking the vaccine to the injury involved in 
the case. These ofi--Table cases often involve complex medical questions 
about which there is likely to be no definitive consensus among experts. 
This has become a particular problem for the Vaccine Program because 
of the dramatic shift f rom the early years of the program, 1989 to l y y / , 
when more than 90% of the petitions filed asserted Table injuries, to the 
most recent years, 2007 to 2010, when almost 90% of die petitions filed 
assert only non-Table injuries.62 
See Neal A. Halsey, Vie Science of Evaluation of Adverse Events Associated until Vacanatwn, 13 
S E M I N A R S I N P E D I A T R I C I N F E C T I O U S DISEASES 205,207 (2002). 
60. &« 42 U.S.C. § 300aa-13(b). 
61. Hauptly & Mason, JM/!ra note 10, at 457. nn_.^QAV9nni 
62. See Stevens v. Sec'y of the Dep't of Health & Human Servs., No. 99-594V, 2001 
W L 387418, at *8 (Fed. C l . Mar. 30, 2001). 
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C. Major Changes in the Table and the Program and Their Consequences 
The National Vaccine Injury Compensation Program changed 
substantially in 1995, when the Secretary of H H S announced modifications 
to the Vaccine Injury Table that would drastically change not only the 
Table, but also die nature of the Vaccine Compensation Program. The 
Table changes have in effect created a new and different vaccine 
compensation program. 
This change in the Table also affected Hannah Bruesewitz's case. 
Hannah's parents filed their petition for compensation in the U .S . Court of 
Federal Claims in A p r i l of 1995, one month after the new Vaccine Injury 
Table,63 which ehminated residual seizure disorder as a Table injury, went 
into effect. Hannah had a strong claim of a residual seizure disorder under 
the prior table;^* but unfortunately for her fanuly this Table injury had 
been ehminated. The special master ruled that Hannah had not proven 
that she either suffered an injury recognized by die Vaccine Injury Table in 
effect at the time she filed her case, or that her seizure disorder and related 
problems were caused in fact by the D T P vaccines she received.ss 
In 1995, because of the administrative rulemaking proceeding instituted 
by the Secretary of HHS66 that modified both the Table and the 
Quahfications and Aides to Interpretation (QAI) of the Table, the Table 
was substantially narrowed.s' The two most important changes that 
aff-ected the largest number of people were the ehmination of residual 
seizure disorder and hypotonic hyporesponsive episode (HHE) as Table 
63. 42 C.F.R. § 100.3 (1995). 
64. To establish a residual seizure disorder under the original Vaccine Injury Table 
Hannah would have had to show that she suffered her first seizure within three days of he^ 
D T P vaccmauon and suffered two or more seizures within one year that were essentially 
afebrile. 42 U.S.C. § 300aa-14(a), (b)(2)(B) (1988). 
65. Bruesewitz v. Sec'y of the Dep't of Health & Human Servs., No. 95-0266V 2002 
W L 31965744, at *17 (Fed. C l . Dec. 20, 2002). 
66. National Vaccine Injury Compensation Program Revision of the Vaccine Iniurv 
Table, 60 Fed. Reg. 7678 (Feb. 8, 1995). ^ ^ 
67. 42 C.F.R. § 100.3 (2010). The Vaccine Act gave the Secretary of H H S the 
autiionty to modify the Table, as agency officials are often empowered by Congress to 
modify the regulations they implement. See 42 U.S.C. § 300aa-14(c), (e)(2) (2006) The 
authonty oftiie Secretary of H H S to make tiie 1995 Table changes was chaUenged in the 
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit in Terran v. Secretary of Health & Human Services 
195 F.3d 1302 (Fed. Cir. 1999). A divided panel of the court upheld die authority of the 
Secretary of H H S to make the 1995 Table changes, rejecting arguments that the changes 
violated the Constitution's Presentment Clause and were an unlawful delegation of 
legislative authonty to an administrative official to amend a statute. Id at 1314-15 Judge 
Plager dissented on the ground that the 1995 changes violated the Presentment Clause Id 
at 1317. 
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injuries,68 and the redefining of the Table injury of encephalopathy from a 
broad, inclusive definition to a hyper-technical and narrow definition that is 
extremely difficult, i f not impossible, to satisfy.69 Moreover, as noted above, 
practically aU of die vaccines added to the Table in recent years have either 
no specified Table injuries, or else they have only the hsted injury of an 
immediate anaphylactic shock reaction.™ 
The Secretary of H H S based the 1995 Table changes largely on a then-
recent report from the Institute of Medicine.?' Several persons who 
submitted comments to the Secretary on the proposed new Table pointed 
out that the Secretary had not considered the results of several large 
databases on vaccine injuries, and urged the Secretary to wait for more 
definitive information before modifying the Table.'2 The Secretary 
responded that it was unnecessary for the information it rehed upon to be 
"definite and conclusive before any changes are made."" Several persons 
also submitted comments indicating that the 1995 rule change would 
substantiaUy change the nature of the Vaccine Injury Compensation 
Program, but the Secretary responded that "the benefits of the proposed 
regulation outweigh the possibihty of more protracted and complex 
hearings."?* 
68. The Table changes substantiaUy reduced the proportion of compensated 
peutioners. This point is dramaticaUy made by the fact that 45% of all claims that 
had been awarded compensation as of 1999 involved injuries later dropped from die 
Table. Clearly, changes to the Table by the Secretary drasticaUy altered the prospect 
for compensation for large numbers of petitioners. 
Jeffrey A. McLeUan, Note, The Constitutional Challenge to the Vaccine Act in Terran v. Secretary 
of Health & Human Services and its Policy Implications, 12 FED. CiR. B.J. 687, 692 (2004) 
(footnotes omitted). 
69. Encephalopathy was initiaUy defined broadly as any "injury to, or impairmem of 
function ofti ie brain." 42 U.S .C. § 3 OOaa-14(b)(3)(A) (1988). The 1995 amendment to the 
Table redefined it much more narrowly to include only those injuries tiiat satisfied tiie 
cntena for an acute and then a chronic encephalopathy. 42 C.F.R. § 100.3(b)(2) (1995). An 
acute encephalopatiiy requires a "significandy decreased level of consciousness" for more 
than twenty-four hours, and a chronic encephalopathy requires a "change in mental or 
neurologic status, first manifested during the appUcable time period, persist[ing] for a period 
of at least 6 months from the date of vaccination. Individuals who retum to a normal 
neurolcgic state after the acute encephalopathy shall not be presumed to have suffered 
residual neurologic damage from that event." Id. § 100.3(b)(2)(i)(A), (b)(ii). 
70. Stevens v. Sec'y of the Dep't of Health & Human Servs., No. 99-594V, 2001 W L 
387418, at *8 n . l l (Fed. C l . Mar. 30, 2001), abrogated in part by Althen v. Sec'y of Health & 
Human Servs., 418 F.3d 1274, 1281 (Fed. Cir. 2005). 
71. National Vaccine Injury Compensation Program Revision of the Vaccine Injury 
Table, 60 Fed. Reg. 7678, 7678 (Feb. 8, 1995) (codified at 42 C.F.R. pt. 100) 
72. Id. at 7681, 7685-86. 
73. /(/.at 7681. 
74 Id at 7682. 
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According to former Chie f Special Master G a r y J . Golkiewicz, the 1995 
rule change did produce a tremendous change in the nature of the vaccine 
claims litigated in die program." In the first few years, practically all cases 
involved only satisfying the Table requirements and adjudicating whether 
another factor unrelated to the vaccine was the likely cause of the injury. 
With the changes in the Table and the subsequent adchtion of many new 
vaccines without any Table injuries, the focus of vaccine case adjudication 
is now dramatically different. Ninety percent of vaccine cases are now 
causation-in-fact cases." The Table was intended to be a crucial 
innovation, a key to the quick, hospitable, and less adversarial Vaccine Act 
proceedings. It is now central to only a small minority of cases. The Table 
has littie significance in resolving the overwhelming majority of vaccine 
cases that come before the court today. 
The recent focus on causation-in-fact cases has also generated other 
major changes in the nature of the Vaccine Injury Program. First, the cases 
are substantially more difficult and complex to htigate. The special masters 
have much more challenging scientific disputes to resolve in these cases 
than they do for Table claims. 
Second, both sides need to locate experts in cutting-edge areas, where 
substantial uncertainty still exists. For the old Table injuries, a neurologist 
would testify whether a petitioner's injury did or did not meet the definition 
of encephalopathy hsted i n the Table, and its Qualifications and Aides to 
Interpretation, and whether the onset of the injury did or chd not occur 
within the time period required by the Table. In off-Table cases, the 
experts now have to present much more complex testimony concerning 
whether the vaccine was the hkely cause of the problems that the petitioner 
subsequendy experienced. 
The complex off-Table cases that now predominate in the Vaccine 
Compensation Program also proceed more slowly than the simpler Table 
injury cases, and typically result in more adversarial htigation than Table 
cases because the parties and their experts usually begin f rom polar 
opposite positions. The relatively easy question of determining whether an 
injury satisfies the Table criteria has become the much more difficult 
question of whether a vaccine in fact caused an injury. These changes have 
encouraged the type of adversarial htigation that the Vaccine Act was 
designed to minimize. 
The result of these changes is that the Vaccine Compensation Program 
today is not at all hke the program that the Supreme Court described in 
Bruesewitz as involving "fast, informal adjudication," focusing on Vaccine 
75. Stevens, 2001 VVL 387418, at *8. 
76. Id. 
802 ADMINISTRATIVE LAW REVIEW [63:4 
Injury Table requirements." Instead, it is a much slower and more 
adversarial process that focuses on formally adjudicating non-Table 
causation-in-fact cases. 
The shift in focus to off-Table cases has also led to the creation of several 
"omnibus proceedings," in which the special masters consohdate a number 
of similar cases into one proceeding. The largest and most controversial 
omnibus proceeding is the ongoing proceeding concerning autism, which 
involves more than 5,000 petitioners. Other omnibus proceedings have 
involved the rubella vaccine and arthritic conditions, the hepatitis B 
vaccine, and other vaccines." 
A final important consequence of the massive switch to ofF-Table cases 
has been a series of decisions from the U . S . Court of Appeals for the 
Federal Circuit, beginning in 2005, which have attempted to clarify the 
legal standards for proving causation-in-fact cases." Under the principles 
enunciated in these cases, petitioners' burden in off-Table cases is to 
demonstrate that a vaccine was a substantial factor in causing an injury, but 
not necessarily the sole or even the predominant factor causing the injury.^o 
Petitioners must also demonstrate that the vaccine was a "but for" cause of 
the injury, in that the injury would not have occurred except for the 
administration of the vaccine.^' Petitioners are not required to prove that a 
specific biological mechanism was the means by which the vaccine caused 
the injury, and are also not required to show that all other possible causes 
for the injury have been eliminated."2 In Althen v. Secretary of Health & 
Human Services, the Federal Circuit specified that to satisfy these burdens, 
petitioners must demonstrate: "(1) a medical theory causally connecting the 
vaccination and the injury; (2) a logical sequence of cause and effect 
showing that the vaccination was the reason for the injury; and (3) a 
showing of a proximate temporal relationship between vaccination and 
injury."^3 
These legal standards are noncontroversial and widely accepted. 
However, a controversy emerged from a line of Federal Circuit cases that 
77. Bruesewitz v. Wyeth L . L . C , 131 S. Ct. 1068, 1073 (2011). 
78. See infra Part II.E.4. 
79. Andreu v. Sec'y of Health & Human Servs., 569 F.3d 1367 (Fed. Cir. 2009); 
Walther v. Sec'y of Health & Human Servs., 485 F.3d 1146 (Fed. Cir. 2007); Palford v. 
Sec'y of Health & Human Servs., 451 F.3d 1352 (Fed. Cir. 2006); Capizzano v, Sec'y of 
Health & Human Servs., 440 F.3d 1317 (Fed. Cir. 2006); Althen v. Sec'y of Health & 
Human Servs., 418 F.3d 1274 (Fed. Cir. 2005). 
80. ^ / t e , 418F.3dat 1278. 
81. Id. 
82. mitiier, 485 F.3d at 1150; Capizzano, 440 F.3d at 1324; Knudsen v. Sec'y of the 
Dep't of Health & Human Servs., 35 F.3d 543, 549 (Fed. Cir. 1994). 
83. Altlien, 4\8 F.Mat 1278. 
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began with Althen in 2005, continued in Walther v. Secretary of Health & 
Human Services in 2007, and included Andreu v. Secretary of Health & Human 
Services in 2009. In these cases, the Federal Circuit emphasized that "close 
calls regarding causation are [to be] resolved in favor of injured 
claimants."8* Such a rule is consistent with Congress's intent that the 
vaccine law create a generous compensation program that was to be 
hberally construed in favor of compensating injured petitioners.^s 
However, a second hne of cases, including De Bazan v. Secretary of Health & 
Human Services in 2008 and Moberly v. Secretary of Health & Human Services in 
2010, takes a very different perspective, emphasizing that traditional tort 
standards should be strictiy apphed to off-Table cases.ss These cases treat 
the Vaccine Act as i f it were a waiver of sovereign immunity, calling for 
legal principles that require the courts to strictiy construe the Act against 
petitioners. 
It is striking that Andreu and Moberly reached such divergent conclusions, 
as they were so factually similar. In both cases, young children developed 
seizure disorders shordy after receipt of a D T P vaccination. In Andreu, the 
onset of the seizure disorder was one day; in Moberly it was two days.^' 
In Andreu, the petitioner's vaccine expert and the child's neurologist both 
testified that the vaccine hkely caused the seizure disorder, and the 
government's expert testified that, while he did not agree that the vaccine 
caused the seizure disorder, he did not contest the biological plausibility of 
that view.88 The Federal Circuit held that petitioner had satisfied the 
apphcable burdens under Althen and ordered that compensation be paid.89 
In Moberly, the Federal Circuit affirmed the special master's denial of 
compensation and distinguished Andreu on two grounds.90 First, the Moberly 
court pointed out that in Andreu the treating physician supported the 
vaccine-injury hnk, while in Moberly the principal treating physician was 
not supportive but was instead skeptical of the vaccine-injury link.9i 
Second, the court noted that in Andreu the government's expert witness had 
84. Andreu, 569 F.3d at 1378 (quoting Cappizano, 440 F.3d at 1325-26); Walther, 485 
F.3d at 1150 {qaotmgAlthen, 418 F.3d at 1280). 
85. See Andreu, 569 F.3d at 1378 (stating that requiring epidemiological studies or 
generally accepted medical principles would impermissibly raise a claimant's burden). 
86. Moberly v. Sec'y of Health & Human Servs., 592 F.3d 1315, 1322-23 (Fed. Cir. 
2010); De Bazan v. Sec'y of Health & Human Servs., 539 F.3d 1347, 1351 (Fed. Cir. 2008); 
see also Grant v. Sec'y of the Dep't of Health & Human Servs., 956 F.2d 1144, 1148 (Fed. 
Cir. 1992). 
87. Moberly, 592 F.3d at m^; Andreu, 569 F.3d at 1370. 
88. See Moberly, 592 F.3d at 1325. 
89. Andreu, 569 F.3d at 1370. 
90. Moberly, 592 F.3d at 1325. 
91. Id 
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not contested the biological plausibihty of the vaccine-injury link, while in 
Moberly the government's expert did contest the biological plausibihty of diis 
link.92 These distinctions confuse radier than clarify the law. 
One crucial consideration for die special masters should not be whether 
the current principal treating physician supports a vaccine injury link. 
Instead, the key consideration should be the weight and authority behind 
the views of the expert witnesses who testify in the case. Similarly, another 
crucial consideration for die special masters should not be whether die 
government's expert accepts the plausibihty of the petitioner's proposed 
vaccine injury hnk. Instead, the key consideration should be die extent of 
the agreement and disagreement between the experts who testify on both 
sides and the strengdi of die grounds in support of the experts' views. The 
Federal Circuit's two bases to distinguish Moberly f rom Andreu are unhelpful 
at best in giving guidance to the special masters or the parties who appear 
before them. 
Unfortunately, the Federal Circuit denied en banc review in Moberly,^^ 
leaving in place substantial uncertainty regarding the appropriate legal 
standards to apply in off-Table cases. Further action from the Federal 
Circuit, die Supreme Court, or Congress will be needed to remedy this 
serious problem and bring clarity to the law that should be apphed in off-
Table cases. 
After the Vaccine Compensation Program had been operating for a 
decade, three major U . S . government organizations evaluated and 
pubhshed reports on the program—the Federal Judicial Center,^* the U . S . 
Government Accountabihty Office (GAO),95 and the House Subcommittee 
on Criminal Justice, D r u g Pohcy, and H u m a n Resources.96 The diree 
reports raised similar concerns about the operation of the Vaccine 
Program, including delays in resolving cases that stretched far beyond the 
statutory 240-day limit,9' and the overly adversarial nature of the cases in a 
compensation program intended to be less adversarial.ss AU three reports 
92. Id. 
9 3 . Moberly v. Sec'y of Health & Human Servs., 3 8 0 F. App'x 142 (Fed. Cir. 2010) . 
94. M O L L Y T R E A D B U R Y J O H N S O N E T A L . . F E D . J U D I C I A L C T R . , U S E O F E X P E R T 
T E S T I M O N Y , S P E C I A U Z E D D E C I S I O N M A K E R S , A N D C A S E - M A N A G E M E N T I N N O V A T I O N S I N 
T H E N A T I O N A L V A C C I N E I N J U R Y C O M P E N S A T I O N P R O G R A M (1998). 
95 . U . S . G O V ' T A C C O U N T A B I L I T Y O F F I C E , G A O / H E H S - 0 0 - 8 , V A C C I N E INJURY 
C O M P E N S A T I O N : P R O G R A M C H A L L E N G E D T O S E T T L E C L A I M S Q I J I C K L Y A N D E A S I L Y (1999) 
[hereinafter G A O V A C C I N E C O M P E N S A T I O N R E P O R T ] . 
96 . H . R . R E P . N O . 106-977 (2000). 
97 . Id at 12; G A O V A C C I N E C O M P E N S A T I O N R E P O R T , supra note 9 5 , at 2; J O H N S O N E T 
A L . , supra note 94, at 5. 
98. H . R . R E P . N O . 106-977 , at 2; G A O V A C C I N E C O M P E N S A T I O N R E P O R T , supra note 
95 , at 3; J O H N S O N E T A L . , supra note 94, at 5. 
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also noted concerns about payment of attorneys' fees, including concerns 
that the fees were too low, took too long to process, and were subject to 
unnecessarily adversarial review by Department of Justice (DOJ) 
attomeys.99 These same concerns have continued to be raised by others,'oo 
and they remam vahd today. Problems with delays and the overly 
adversarial nature of the program have been exacerbated by the change in 
the Vaccine Table and the related developments described above. 
Other problems that have been noted with tibe Vaccine Program include 
the short, inflexible three-year statute of limitations to file a claim in the 
program; die low $250,000 award for death cases; the low $250,000 cap on 
pain and sufFering in injury cases; and the burden of proof imposed on 
petitioners in off-Table cases, lo' Part I V of this Article proposes specific 
steps to try to correct these problems. 
D. The Special Masters' Role in the Decisionmaking Process 
The Vaccine Act created a partially inquisitorial and partially 
adversarial process for adjudicating vaccine injury claims.'02 The special 
99. H . R . R E P . N O , 106-977, at 17; G A O V A C C I N E C O M P E N S A T I O N R E P O R T , supra note 
95, at 11; J O H N S O N E T A L . , supra note 94, at 5; see also BestyJ. Grey, The Plague of Causation in 
the National Childhood Vaccine Injury Act, 48 H A R V . J . O N L E G I S . 343, 355 n.87 (2011) (noting 
that the Act encourages use of the Vaccine Program because fees are awarded even when 
the petitioning party fails to quaUfy for compensation, as long as the petition was brought in 
good faith). 
100. See, Joanna B. Apolinsky & Jeffrey A. Van Delta, Rethinking Uabilitji for Vaccine 
Injury, 19 C O R N E L L J . L . & P U B . P O L ' Y 537, 635-36 (2010) (arguing for a totally new holistic 
framework for vaccine injury compensation); Ehzabeth A . Breen, Note, A One Shot Deal: The 
National Childhood Vaccine Injury Act, 41 V V M . & M A R Y L. R E V . 309, 319-20 (1999); Brittani 
Scott Miller, Note, The National Childhood Vaccine Injury Compensation Program: The UnLaikbilify 
of Experienced Attomeys Places Petitioners at an Institutional Disadvantage, 19 F E D . CiR. B J . 253, 272 
(2010); Ridgway, supra note 32, at 74 ("No aspect of the [Nadonal Vaccine Injury 
Compensation Program] has been more intensively disputed tiian the awarding of attomey 
fees."); Elizabeth C. Scott, Comment, The National Childhood Vaccine Injury Act Turns Fifteen, 56 
F O O D & D R U G L J . 351, 362 (2001); Lisa J . Steel, Note, National Childhood Vaccine Injury 
Compensation Program: Is This the Best We Can Do for Our Children?, 63 G E O . W A S H . L . R E V . 144, 
170-71 (1994) (discussing the lack of definitive evidence in the vaccine injury area). 
101. Apolinsky & Van Detta, supra note 100, at 580; Breen, supra note 100, at 319-20; 
MiUer, supra note 100, at 172; Scott, supra note 100, at 361; Steel, supra note 100, at 170. 
102. American legal procedures are said to flow from the British common law 
adversarial tradition, in contrast to the legal procedures used in tiie inquisitorial tradition of 
continental Europe. See Amalia D . Kessler, Our Inquisitorial Tradition: Equity Procedure, Due 
Process, and the Search for an Alternative to the Adversarial, 90 C O R N E L L L. R E V . 1181, 1198-1210 
(2005) (detaihng the development of the common law in the United States). Aldiough all 
court systems seem to combine some elements of both models, id. at 1187, the two 
contrasting models have been described as follows: 
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masters have much greater control and responsibihty in processing cases 
than a state or federal judge has in the typical civil case. The special 
masters are given authority to participate actively in the cases and to 
structure the process for each case. They are not expected to play the 
neutral umpire's role as are judges in other sorts of civil htigation. io3 This 
model of the decisionmaker in an adversarial system is one of a largely 
passive receiver of information who Ustens to what both sides have to say 
and then renders a decision based only on the most persuasive evidence 
mtroduced and the arguments made by counsel. "04 
In the adversanal model, the parties are responsible for . . . conducting the htigation. 
1 hey gather all the evidence and present it orally, in open court, subjecting witaesses 
to examination and cross-examination, and the court serves as a neutral umpire 
deciding questions of fact and law raised by the parties. In addition, the parties bea^ 
pnmary responsibility for determining the sequence and manner in which evidence is 
presented and legal issues are argued. In contrast, in the inquisitional model the 
cour t . . . undertakes significant responsibility for gathering evidence, not just for 
ruhng on the conclusions that should be drawn from i t . . . . Furthermore, the court is 
largely responsible for determining die sequence and manner in which issues of fact 
and law are considered and decided. 
M at 1188 (footnotes omitted); . . . also Ellen E. Sward, Values, Ideology, and the Evolution of the 
Adversary System, 64 iND. L.J. 301, 313-14 (1989). In die inquisitorial model, the 
deasionmaker can be the individual who initiates the Htigation, as opposed to one of the 
parties. at 313. The inquisitorial model relies more heavily on written documents, such 
as witness affidavits obtained by the investigating magistrate, as opposed to relying largely on 
oral testimony from witaesses introduced in court hearings by counsel for the parties. Id at 
103. G U I D E U N E S F O R P R A C T I C E , supra note 47, at § V ; U.S. C T . O F F E D C L A I M S 
V A C C I N E R . 3(b). See generally United States v. Marzano, 149 F.2d 923, 926 (2d Cir 1945)-
Robinson v. United States, 513 A.2d 218, 220 (D.C. Cir. 1986). 
104. The Guiddines for Practice and the Vaccine Rules describe the many informal 
inquisitional procedures that the program employs, including an informal off-the-record 
status conference shortiy after the petition and respondent's report are filed, pursuant to 
Vaccine Ru k 5. At this conference the special master "(1) gives each party an opportunity 
to address the other s position, (2) states a temative view on the merits of the case, and (3) 
es abhshes with the parties what issues remain to be addressed and the most efficient means 
tor deciding those issues." G U I D E L I N E S F O R P R A C T I C E , note 47, at 8 V I The 
Guidehnes continue: , x . xnc 
The special master wiU be more actively involved in the early stages of proceedings 
than IS usually the case with a judge in a traditional civil proceeding, e.g., identifying 
and assisting a party in obtaining information, making tentative findings where 
appropnate . . . . Further, in recognition of Congress's intent that the special masters 
be more inquisitorial" than in typical Htigation, the special master will question 
witaesses where appropriate, ask for more documents when .such a need is 
determmed, and keep the parties infonned at aU stages concerning what further proof 
IS necessary to prove their cases. 
Id. at § V . Special masters are given the autiiority to receive evidence in person by 
telephone, or m wnting; there is no right of parties to cross-examine witaesses, and neither 
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In contrast to this famihar image, the special masters were intended to be 
expert decisionmakers with substantial knowledge of vaccine injuries and 
substantial authority to structure how each case proceeds. The Vaccine 
Act also mandates procedural rules that "provide for a less-adversarial, 
expeditious, and informal proceechng"io? which wil l have "flexible and 
informal standards of achnissibihty of evidence."i08 
The Vaccine Act, as originally passed by Congress, gave the special 
masters the more hmited role of only making proposed findings of fact, 
proposed conclusions of law, and recommended decision to a judge of the 
U .S . Court of FederEd Claims, who would then make the actual decision in 
the case. The judges would often give substantial deference to the 
findings and proposed decision of the special master who presided over the 
evidentiary hearing in the case.no 
A few years later, an amendment to the Vaccine Act changed this 
situation, giving the special masters full authority, hke any trial judge or 
administrative law judge, to issue decisions.m This created an unusual 
structure in the Court of Federal Claims. The Office of Special Masters is 
an "adjunct" to the Court. The special masters now make all final 
decisions, which are subject to review first by a judge of the Court of 
Federal Claims,ii2 then by the U . S . Court of Appeals for the Federal 
the Federal Rules of Evidence nor the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure apply. Vaccine 
Rule 8(b) provides: "In receiving evidence, the special master will not be bound by common 
law or statutory rules of evidence " U.S. Cx . O F F E D . C L A I M S V A C C I N E R. 8(b)(1). 
105. &e J O H N S O N E T A L . , supra note 94, at 14-15 (stating that even though Congress 
envisioned some nonlawyer scientists serving as special masters, all special masters have had 
a law degree). 
106. There is always a tension between the desirability of having an expert 
decisionmaker, who can bring specialized knowledge and experience in the area, and the 
problems that can arise, such as when the expert decisionmaker can become biased or come 
to regard himself or herself as the "real" expert who has heard many similar cases before, 
and will only use the testimony received from the medical experts who testify at hearings 
insofar as that testimony supports the special master's preexisting positions. See Sward, supra 
note 102, at 338-39. Similar tensions exist for decision makers on other speciaHzed courts, 
such as bankruptcy and tax courts on the federal level, and in probate, family, and other 
special courts at the state level. Id. at 338 & n. 197. 
107. 42 U.S.C. §300aa-12(d)(2)(A) (2006). 
108. W. §300aa-12(d)(2)(B). 
109. Haupdy & Mason, supra note 10, at 452. 
110. The Claims Court judge could accept the special master's recommendations in 
whole or in part, remand the decision with instructions, or undertake de novo review. Id. at 
457 n. 19. 
111. /rf. at452. 
112. This puts the Claims Court judge in an unusual position, because in most other 
cases, the judge acts as the initial decisionmaker, but in vaccine cases, the judge acts as a 
reviewing authority. 
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Circuit, with discretionary certiorari review by die Supreme Court "3 
Judges from the Court of Federal Claims and the Federal Circmt apply 
famihar pnnciples of judicial review to special masters' decisions, giving 
substanual deference to findings of fact, credibility decisions, and 
discretionaiy judgments, but reviewing the special masters' application of 
pnnciples of law de novo. "* 
In the first months of the Vaccine Compensation Program, the 
Department of Justice withdrew from aU cases before the special masters, 
citing budgetary constraints, na During this time, the vast majority of cases 
before the special masters proceeded without die Secretary of H H S being 
represented by counsel.na These cases proceeded in a relatively i n fonnd 
and nonadyersarial manner, with the special masters playing the largely 
inquisitonal role that Congress had envisioned for them. However when 
the Department of Justice began representing H H S in 1989-1990 the 
relatively mfonnal and nonadversarial nature of the htigation b e g ^ to 
change substantiaUy. i n The Departmem of Justice estabUshed a group of 
attorneys specializing in htigating diese vaccine cases, and the H H S 
estabhshed both an in-house group of experts to evaluate vaccine iniury 
claims and an outside group of expert witnesses to testify for the 
government in its defense of the cases.Hs Since that time, there has been 
cnticism that the vaccine cases have become too adversarial, and that the 
mfonnal inquisitorial manner in which the special masters had initiaUy 
processed these cases has changed to a more traditional adversarial 
H , v l ' f V f ^ f ° ^^ - ' 2 ( eH) . The Supreme Court has reviewed only one case on 
T H , J u ' ™ ' ' • ' ^ ' ^^ Whitecotton, 514 U.S 268 (19951 
o r r s s t : r d . ' " . r 2 r — -
114. The Vaccine Act contains the usual standards for judicial review, aUowing the 
judge from the U.S. Court of Federal Claims or the Federal Circuit to "set aside any 
findings of fact or conclusion of law of the special master found to be arbitrary, capricious 
?act a T ™ ^ ' l - - 1 - and issue its o ^ iZ^oi 
n l r t h e T f 7 ' ' f ''- ^ ^^Oaa-12(e)(2)(B). Findings of fact are reviewed 
under the deferential "arbitrary and capricious" standard. See Lampe v. Sec'y of Health & 
Human Sen-s., 219 F ^ d 1357, 1360 (Fed. Cir. 2000). Discredona'ry rulings^a^ wed 
under a deferential "abuse of discretion" standard. Saunders v. Sec'y of the Dep't of H e l l h 
L t T u n d r S e ' ' H ? ^^-^'y> conclusions of law ; reviewed under die nondeferential de novo standard. Id. 
115. Hauptly & Mason, supra note 10, at 457 n 21 
u n l e p r e s e " . ^ " ' " ' ° ' P ^ " " * ^ ^ * ^ ^ P^«^ h^e respondent 
themselves t i ^ fh ' *e participants in the Vaccine Program to re-dedicate 
n ^ Z r ° * ^ " ° " ^ d v e r s a n a l resolution of cases. H .R . R E P . N o . 101-386, at 512-13 
(1989) (Conf Rep.), reprinted in 1989 U . S . C . C . A . N . 3018, 3115-16 
118. G A O V A C C I N E C O M P E N S A T I O N R E P O R T , suprJnote 95, at 10. 
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process."9 Off-Table cases, particularly, have become much more 
burdensome for peddoners and have moved more slowly, with very few 
cases actually decided within the statutory 240-day deadline for a final 
decision.'20 
Another reason for delay in Vaccine Act cases is that they are generally 
bifurcated into two separate stages. In the first stage, the sole issue is 
whether the petitioner has proven entidement to receive compensation for 
a vaccine injury. If petitioner is successful at this stage, the case then 
proceeds to the second stage, which involves a determination of the amount 
of compensation to be awarded. The damages stage is often complex and 
protracted and commonly exceeds, by itself, the 240-day statutory deadhne 
for final resolution of the entire case.'^i 
Delays in the Vaccine Program have been caused by counsel for 
petitioners as well as by counsel for the government for a number of 
reasons, including difficulties in obtaining mecUcal records and expert 
reports. There can be times when it is advantageous for petitioner's 
counsel to seek delays, such as when petitioner's retained expert 
recommends new, time-consuming medical testing of the petitioner. 
Additionally, delay could be proper where it might be beneficial in 
preparing a hfe-care plan involving an infant to learn more over time about 
that infant's degree of impairment, and to get a better idea of the infant's 
likely future medical and therapeutic needs. 
E. Procedural Innovations in the Vaccine Compensation Program 
There are a number of successful procedural and case-management 
innovations that have been developed in the Vaccine Program, some as a 
result of mandates contained in the initial legislation and some as a result of 
innovative practices that the special masters have adopted over the years. 
Pretrial innovations such as front-loading of evidence and expert reports, 
and a variety of informal procedures such as telephonic "off the record" 
119. Lawrence O. Gostin, Medical Countermeasures for Pandemic Influenza: Ethics and the Law, 
295 J . A M . M E D . A S S ' N . 554, 555 (2006). 
120. G A O V A C C I N E C O M P E N S A T I O N R E P O R T , supra note 95, at 2. 
121. The Vaccine Act specifies the damages that can be awarded. When the vaccine 
reaction resulted in the death of the petitioner, a lump-sum payment in the amount of 
$250,000 will be made to petitioner's estate. 42 U . S . C . § 30f)aa-15(a)(2) (2006). For 
vaccine-related injuries, the petitioner is entided to receive payment for past and future pain 
and suffering (capped at $250,000), future lost income, and reasonably necessary future 
medical, therapeutic, and related expenses. Id § SOOaa-15(a)(1), (3)-"(4). 
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status conferences, have generally worked out well and could serve as a 
model in other types of htigation.'22 
In many ways, the evidentiary hearings held before the special masters 
look like typical civil trials. Counsel for both sides may make opening 
statements and then introduce the testimony of fact witnesses, such as 
family members, as well as medical exhibits and testimony from mecHcal 
experts. A t the conclusion of the evidence, counsel may make closing 
arguments or may submit post-hearing briefs at a later date. While these 
trials look sunilar to other civil trials in some respects, they are also unique 
in several important ways. In this Author's opinion, the most important 
innovation is the wholesale integration by the special masters of the expert 
witnesses into the evidentiary hearings rather than the usual procedure of 
sequestering the expert witnesses when they are not testifying in open court. 
1. The Expanded Role of Expert Witnesses at Hearings 
The standard rule of procedure used in virtually all courtrooms in 
America, civil and criminal, is to exclude nontestifying witnesses f rom the 
courtroom while other witnesses in the case are t e s t i f y i n g . T h e "rule on 
witnesses," a rule that was hundreds of years old in the British juchcial 
tradition when it was brought over to the American colonies, directs the 
removal or sequestration of aU nontestifying witnesses so they cannot hear 
the testimony that other witnesses in the case give in court under oath. 
This sequestration procedure has been praised as "one of the greatest 
engines that the skill of man has ever invented for the detection of hars in a 
court of justice."i24 
Rule 615 of the Federal Rules of Evidence gives the parties the right to 
exclude all nontestifying vsitnesses from the courtroom upon request to the 
judge.'23 Federal Rule 615 does create some exceptions,'26 but the only 
relevant one provides that the judge may allow a person to remain in the 
courtroom "whose presence is shown by a party to be essential to the 
122. The Federal Judicial Center noted that these pretrial innovations appeared to be 
working well in its 1998 Report on the Vaccine Program. J O H N S O N E T A L . , supra note 94, at 
25-39. 
123. See Geders v. United States, 425 U.S. 80, 87 (1976) (discussing the sequestering of 
witnesses); Sarah Chapman Carter, Exclusion of Justice: The Need for a Consistent Application of 
Witness Sequestration Under Federal Rule of Evidence 615, 30 U . D A Y T O N L . R E V . 63, 63-64 
(2004). 
124. Opus 3 Ltd. V. Heritage Park, Inc., 91 F.3d 625, 628 (4th Cir. 1996) {citing 6 J O H N 
H E N R Y W I G M O R E , E V I D E N C E I N T R I A L S A T C O M M O N L A W § 1838, James H . Chadboum 
ed., 1976)). 
125. F E D . R . E V I D . 6 1 5 . 
126. Id 
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presentation of the party's cause."i27 The courts have read this exemption, 
and the other exemptions in Rule 615, quite narrowly and have found it 
insufficient that the expert witness a party sought to have remain in the 
courtroom was merely "desirable" or "helpful"; the standard is a much 
higher one of the witness's continued presence in the courtroom being 
"essential," in that counsel would be unable to function effectively without 
the presence of the expert witness in court.'28 
In vaccine cases, by contrast, the expert witnesses are not sequestered 
until they testify, but generally sit at counsel table throughout the entire 
proceeding, including all of the opening discussions, the testimony, and the 
legal arguments of the lawyers. They even consult with counsel during the 
proceeding. The experts can testify after having heard all prior fact 
testimony, and do not have to give their opinions based upon hypothetical 
facts or facts related to them from prior testimony. Not only do the experts 
in vaccine hearings have the opportunity to consult with counsel for their 
side during the entire hearing, but the special master may also grant 
requests for one expert to ask questions of the other side's expert who is 
currently testifying on the witness stand. A special master can even allow 
the experts to have a dialogue between themselves on the record. 
This modified procedure has a number of advantages. Knowing that 
each side's expert is Hstening to the other's every word encourages the 
experts to avoid more extreme or unsupportable claims. It also provides 
opportunities to ask the experts about what points they agree upon, which 
can substantially narrow the issues in chspute between the experts. The 
experts can also point put the problems they see widi the other experts' 
expressed views. This procedure encourages a more informed and less 
attorney-controlled decisionmaking process. 
2. Front-Loading of Documents and Evidence 
Congress imposed a front-loading requirement, which in theory requires 
that all petitions for compensation be accompanied by complete 
documentation, including all medical records (which for a young child 
would include prenatal, birth, and pediatric records) and affidavits or 
127. Id. 
128. United States v. Klaphake, 64 F.3d 435, 437 (8th Cir. 1995); United States v. 
Agnes, 753 F.2d 293, 307 (3d Cir. 1985). It would seem difficult for either counsel in a 
typical vaccine injury case to claim that the presence of an expert witness at counsel table 
was "essential" because these counsel are typically very experienced and knowledgeable 
about vaccine injury Htigation, and they could function effectively at the hearing even if their 
expert witnesses were not present at counsel table. Moreover, experts routinely submit their 
reports prior to hearing, and these are routinely shared and discussed by counsel and 
counsel's expert witnesses. 
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statements f rom aU fact witnesses and expert witaesses that petitioner 
mtends to rely on in the case.'29 The Secretary of H H S is also directed to 
respond to the petition for compensation with all objections and include aU 
supporting medical documentation and expert opinions on which H H S 
seeks to rely. 130 Although diese requirements have the desired effect of 
getting some potentiaUy relevant mformation into the record at the earhest 
possible date, the typical case is usuaUy burdened by substantial delays in 
completing the record. Hospitals or other healdicare providers delay or 
resist providing the needed documentation, and delays occur for other 
reasons as weU. This procedure has certainly been an improvement over 
the "hide the baU" discovery that can be typical in civil cases, but it has not 
substantially expedited the cases. Reports issued by the G A O and the 
Federal Judicial Center have documented both the advantages of the front-
loading procedure and the continuing problems with die delays in vaccine 
cases 
3. Informal Procedures, Including Telephonic Conferences 
There are a number of other informal and electronic pretrial procedures 
that the Vaccine Compensation Program has adopted to good effect. For 
example, shortly after the parties have submitted the petition and report, an 
informal, off-the-record statas conference is generaUy held by telephone 
dunng which the special master provides counsel with prehminary thoughts 
or ideas about the strengdis and weaknesses of the case, and die parties can 
also talk informaUy about procedures for resolving the case.i32 These 
conferences also identify omissions in the record, the need for additional 
testimony, and matters of timing diat need to be addressed. 
In the Vaccine Program, virtuaUy all pretrial statas conferences and 
other pretnal proceedings are conducted telephonically, widi the special 
master's office connecting counsel for both sides. Telephonic pretrial 
proceedings are much more efficient than the typical practice of bringing 
counsel and parties into a courtroom to wait while odier cases are heard, 
resulting m attorneys wasting time and generating unnecessary fees. 
The telephonic status conferences are a necessity in a court with 
nationwide jurisdiction, involving petitioners' counsel and pro se petitioners 
located in aU parts of the United States. However, the clear benefits in 
129. 42 U . S . C . §§ 300aa-l 1(c) to (c) (2006). These records must be filed electronicaUy. 
See supra note il. ' 
130. U . S . C T . O F F E D . C L A I M S V A C C I N E R . 4(C). 
131. G A O V A C C I N E C O M P E N S A T I O N R E P O R T , supra note 95, at 2-3, 5; J O H N S O N E T A L . , 
.a/ira note 94, at 25-27. ' 
132. U . S . C T . O F F E D . C L A I M S V A C C I N E R . 5(a). 
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time, cost, and efficiency in holding routine status conferences and other 
pretrial proceedings telephonically should be experimented with by other 
courts regardless of geographical considerations. The usefulness of these 
procedures has been documented in several governmental reports on the 
Vaccine Compensation Program.'33 
4. Omnibus Proceedings 
Another creative solution invented by the Office of Special Masters to 
consider multiple cases raising similar vaccine injury issues is the "omnibus 
proceeding." In these omnibus proceedings, multiple cases are 
consohdated for purposes of joint evidentiary hearings and decisions on 
general questions of causation. Sometimes omnibus proceedings are 
formed to unify decisions on specific test cases, and sometimes to apply new 
"Tables" of presumed vaccine injury causation that are issued by the 
special masters themselves. 
The omnibus autism proceeding has been the largest and longest 
running omnibus proceeding, involving more than 5,000 individual 
petitioners. It began in 2002, and is stiU ongoing in 201 l.i^s It is also the 
omnibus proceeding that has generated the most controversy.'^e This 
133. See G A O V A C C I N E C O M P E N S A T I O N R E P O R T , supra note 95, at 2-3; J O H N S O N E T 
. \ L . , supra note 94, at 34-43, 44. 
134. Snyder v. Sec'y of the Dep't of Health & Human Servs., No. 01-162V, 2009 W L 
332044, at *4-5 n.l2 (Fed. C l . Feb. 12, 2009). 
135. Id.aX*A-l. 
136. See generally Steven J . Meyers, Note, Denyir^ the Obvious: Why the Special Masters Should 
Have Found fir Petitioners in the Autism Omnibus Test Cases, 20 F E D . CiR. B J . 633 (2011). These 
controversies have included the excessive time it is taking to resolve the cases, the improper 
exclusion of evidence offered by petitioners, and the division of the omnibus proceeding 
between three special masters who heard the general causation evidence together in one 
consohdated hearing. See, e.g, Hazlehurst v. Sec'y of Health & Human Servs., 604 F.3d 
1343, 1345 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (noting that the full record encompassed "tens of thousands of 
pages of medical Uteratare, more than four thousand pages of hearing testimony, and fifty 
expert reports"); Snyder v. Sec'y of Health & Human Servs., 88 Fed. C l . 706, 721 (2009) 
(attempting to exclude expert reports because of the "last-minute" nature of the evidence); 
Joelle Anne Moreno, It's Just a Shot Away: MMR Vaccines and Autism and the End of the 
Daubertista Revolution, 35 W M . M I T C H E L L L . R E V . 1511, 1514-15 (2009) (discussing how 
Special Master George L. Hastings reviewed "23 separate medical expert reports, heard live 
testimony from 16 expert witnesses, and reviewed 658 medical journal articles" all on his 
own); Gordon Shemin, Comment, Mercury Rising: The Omnibus Autism Proceeding and What 
Families Should Know Before Rushing Out of Vaccine Court, 58 A M . U . L . R E V . 459, 513 (2008) 
(recommending changes in the autism proceeding and the elimination of all omnibus 
proceedings); Parents and Physicians Outraged Over Comments from MC's Dr. Snyderman on Autism 
Omnibus Hearings, B I O T E C H W K . , July 4, 2007, available at 2007 W L N R 12218153; Jordan 
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complex proceeding is exploring several alternate links between vaccines 
and aunstic spectrum disorders, and it is divided between three different 
special masters who are considering issues simultaneously.'3? The three 
special masters have issued dieir ruhngs in the test cases, finding no likely 
reladonship between the measles, mumps, and rubeUa ( M M R ) vaccines or 
thimerosal and autistic spectrum disorders, and these cases have been 
affirmed on appeal to date.'38 
In 1992-1993, an omnibus proceeding was held involving the rubella 
vaccme and arthritis-like conditions before Special Master George L 
Hastings. After conducting extensive hearings. Special Master Hastings 
issued a final ruling i n which he concluded that the evidence more Kkely 
than not showed that the rubella vaccine caused a chronic arthropathy i f a 
number of specific conditions were satisfied.'39 
Special Master Hastings in effect grafted a new Table for the rubella 
vaccine into the Vaccine Act. The criteria he estabhshed functioned 
exactly as did the criteria for other Table injuries—they created a 
Weissmann, hiuyers: Autism Rulings Won't End Htigation, L A W . C O M (Feb. 16 2009) 
http://www.law.com/jsp/article.jsp?id= 1202428201092. 
i ^ ^ ' K I^ L^IT^ P"*' questions that have been litigated are whetiier the measles, mumps 
and rubeUa (MMR) vaccines cause autism and whether the vaccine additive thimerosd 
causes autism. 
Hpif.n r ? 7 n 7 . f ' ' ^ ^ S'''^^-' No. 03-1202V, 2010 W L 
892250 (Fed. C l . Mar. 12, 2010) (Special Master Denise K . VoweU); King v. Sec'; of Health 
& Human Servs., No. 03-584V, 2010 W L 892296 (Fed. C l . Mar. 12, 2010) (Special Master 
m^ofn V T n f T f ' ^ '^"^ ^" ' ' ^ ^ Servs., No. 03-215V, 2010 W L 
f H , f 1- 2- (^P'^""' ^ ' " ' ' ' ^ P^'"cia Campbell-Smith); Ced/llo v. Sec'y 
of Health & Human Servs., No. 98-916V, 2009 W L 331968 (Fed. C l . Feb. 12, 2009 
(Special Master George L. Hastings), a f f d , 89 Fed. C l . 158; Hazlehurst v. Sec'y of the Dep't 
of Health & Human Sews., No. 03-654V, 2009 W L 332306 (Fed. C l Feb 12 2009) 
r -^ 'omn e ' ' ' / ^ ' " " ^ ^^'"Pb'^U-Smith), a f f d , 88 Fed. C l . 473, a f f d , 604 F.3d 1343 (Fed 
3-^90^ S ' ° ' P ' * ^ Seivs., xNo. 01-162V, 2009 W L 
(2009) ' ^ 1 he cases decided to date have not rejected all possible hnks between vaccines and 
autism. For example, one autism case was recently settled where the vaccination 
significantly aggravated a pre-existing mitochondrial disorder. See Pohng v. Sec'y of Health 
July s ' T o i o T " ' '''''' J^" -
139. Fhese conditions were that: (1) the petitioner was at least eighteen years old when 
the vaccmauon was given, (2) the onset of the arthropathic symptoms occurred between one 
and SIX weeks after the vaccination, (3) petitioner developed an antibody response to the 
vaccme, (4) petitioner was free of polyarthropathy joint pain for at least three years prior to 
the vaccination, (5) there was no alternative explanation for the arthropathy, such as a 
diagnosis of rheumatoid arthritis, and (6) there was a continuation of symptoms for at least 
w r T ^ o ^ ^ n ^ ' " ' ^ ° ^ P ' ' °f & Human Servs., No. 90-1435V 1993 W L 179430, at * 13 (Fed. Cl . Jan. 11, 1993) u i M O v, i jy^ 
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rebuttable presumption that the rubeUa vaccine caused the injury, but this 
presumpdon could be overcome by a showing that some other condition 
was the actual cause of the symptoms. It is true, as Special Master Hastings 
mdicated in his final d e c i s i o n , t h a t the criteria he estabhshed did not 
conclusively determine any future case that a petitioner might bring 
because a future petitioner was free to introduce additional evidence and 
argue for a difierent result. However, it is also true that any party in any 
case can always ask the decisionmaker to reconsider a previously taken 
position. Yet without providing dramatic new evidence, a petitioner is not 
likely to be successful.'41 
Another omnibus proceeding, held in 2006, involved whether the 
hepatitis B vaccine causes four demyehnating conditions: transverse myehtis 
(TM), chronic inflammatory demyehnating disease (CIDP), GuiUain-Barre 
syndrome (GBS), and multiple sclerosis (MS). Special Master Laura D . 
Mi l lman ruled in favor of the petitioners in each of the four paradigm 
casesi« and created a judicial scheme that operated almost as i f it were a 
"Table" for the hepatitis B vaccine, with a presumption that the vaccine 
caused the conditions i f the onset was between three and thirty days of the 
vaccination. i« Other omnibus proceedings have involved improperly 
140. /</. a t * l l . 
141. Dramatic new evidence in the form of new studies did appear a few years later 
involvang the rubella vaccine and arthropathy. This led the Department of Justice to ask 
Special Master Hastings to reopen tiie omnibus proceeding and, in Kght of the new studies 
WT o standards he had estabhshed for presumed causation. See Snyder, 2002 
VVL 31965742, at *11. Special Master Hastings agreed to re-open the omnibus proceeding, 
held heanngs on the newly pubhshed studies, and concluded that he should keep his prior 
CTitena for enutiement with two minor modifications: (1) he broadened the requirement that 
the petitioner must be at least eighteen years of age to a requirement that the petitioner be 
past puberty, but (2) he narrowed the time period for the onset of the arthropathy from a 
one to six week penod to a seven to twenty-one day period. Id. at *20 
, A r l * ? ; . n l " ' ' ' " ' ' ' ' ^'^'^'y ° ^ P ' ' of Health & Human Servs., No. 99-310V, 2006 
W L 1672884, at * 27 (Fed. C l . May 26, 2006) (finding a connection between the vaccine and 
mulfaple sclerosis); Peugh v. Sec'y ofti ie Dep't of Health & Human Servs., No 99-638V 
2006 W L 5668229, at *13 (Fed. C l . Apr. 21, 2006) (finding a connection between the 
vaccine and GuiUain-Barre syndrome); Gilbert v. Sec'y of the Dep't of Health & Human 
Servs., No. 04-455V, 2006 W L 1006612, at *12 (Fed. C l . Mar. 30, 2006) (finding a 
connection between the vaccine and chronic inflammatoiy demyehnating disease); Stevens 
v. hec y of the Dep't of Health & Human Servs., No. 99-594V, 2006 W L 659525 at *25 
(Fed C l . Feb. 24, 2006) (finding a connection between the vaccine and transverse myehtis) 
143. Stevens, 2006 W L 659525, at *12, *15. In a subsequent decision, based on new 
evidence. Special Master MiUman extended the appropriate temporal relationship out to 
?^o,w°oano ? ' ™ - ' '""" '" '"^ S'^'y ^-^P'^ of Health & Human Seivs., No. 04-178IV, 2008 W L 4447607, at *5 (Fed. C l . Sept. 17, 2008). 
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manufactured polio vaccines'** and the relationship of the hepatitis B 
vaccine to type I diabetes.'*5 
These omnibus proceedings conducted by the special masters have been 
a creative and effective use of the program's resources, despite the fact that 
some of the proceedings have been controversial.'*6 There is no explicit 
authority in the Vaccine Ac t for such omnibus proceedings, so the special 
masters have based their authority to hold such consolidated proceedings 
on the broad discretion and authority that the Act gives the special masters 
to structure and control proceedings in the Vaccine Compensation 
Program.'*? These omnibus proceedings are also the result of the major 
shift in the Vaccine Compensation Program to off-Table cases, so that the 
special masters are seeking in effect to create their own "Tables" to address 
some of the difficult off-Table injuries that commonly recur in the program. 
I I . O T H E R R E C E N T F E D E R A L C O M P E N S A T I O N P R O G R A M S 
Subsequent to the adoption of the Vaccine Act , Congress enacted five 
other major federal compensation programs: the Radiation Exposure 
Compensation Program, the Japanese-American internment compensation 
program, the Smallpox Compensation Program, the September 11th 
Compensation Program, and the Countermeasures Compensation 
Program. These compensation programs were, like the Vaccine Act, often 
a blend of humanitarian, compassionate concerns for injured individuals, 
and a desire to protect industries that were too big or important to fail. 
144. Gherardi v. Sec'y of die Dep't of Health & Human Servs., No. 90-1466V, 1997 
W L 53449, at *1 (Fed. C l . Jan. 24, 1997); Baggott v. Sec'y of the Dep't of Health & Human 
Servs., No. 90-2214V, 1992 W L 79987, at *1 (Cl. Ct. Apr. 2, 1992). 
145. Hennessy v. Sec'y of the Dep't of Health & Human Servs., No. 01 -190V, 2009 W L 
1709053, at *2, *59 (Fed. C l . May 29, 2009), a f f d , 91 Fed. C l . 126, 142 (2010) (holding that 
there was no proven relationship between the hepatitis B vaccine and type I diabetes). 
146. See supra note 136 and accompanying text. In both Snyder and Cedilla, the Court of 
Federal Claims judges ruled that it was not improper for the omnibus proceeding to be 
divided between three special masters who heard the evidence of general causation together 
in one consolidated hearing. The Snyder court said that this procedure "reflects a common-
sense, cost-saving approach to complex htigation." Snyder v. Sec'y of Health & Human 
Servs., 88 Fed. C l . 706, 721 (2009). The Cedilla court called it "an eminently reasonable case 
management approach." Cedillo v. Sec'y of Health & Human Servs., 89 Fed. C l . 158, 174 
(2009). 
147. Snyder, 2009 W L 332044, at *2. Special Master Denise K . VoweU has noted that 
omnibus proceedings "bear some resemblance to multi-district htigation in federal district 
court." Dwyer v. Sec'y of the Dep't of Health & Human Servs., No. 03-1202V, 2010 W L 
B92250, at *2 n.9 (Fed. C l . Mar. 12, 2010). Omnibus proceedings also share similarities 
with administrative rulemaking proceedings and class action lawsuits. Hazlehurst v. Sec'y of 
the Dep't of Health & Human Servs., No. 03-654V, 2009 W L 332306, at *2-3 (Fed. C l . 
Feb. 12, 2009). 
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Additionally, there was a desire to promote other important national 
interests, including public health and national security interests. While 
each of these programs arose f rom unique circumstances, they share many 
similarities and some important differences. 
Some of the features of these newer compensation programs, such as the 
relaxed burden of proof imposed on petitioners, should be adopted in the 
Vaccine Program. These newer programs also offer valuable lessons for 
compensation programs that Congress may consider adopting in the future. 
The background and key features of these newer compensation programs 
are briefly described below. 
A. The Radiation Exposure Compensation Program 
Congress passed the Radiation Exposure Compensation Act ( R E C A ) in 
1990.1*9 The Act contained an apology and provided hmited compensation 
to individuals who developed serious diseases as a result of exposure to 
radiation from above-ground atomic weapons testing, and to individuals 
who participated in the mining or transportation of radioactive materials 
used in making the nuclear devices.'50 
R E C A recognized, after many years of official government denials, that 
persons exposed to radiation in connection with the nuclear weapons 
production program "were subjected to [an] increased risk of injury and 
disease to serve the national security interests of the United States,"'5' and 
that it was appropriate "to make partial restitution . . . for the burdens they 
148. The descriptions of these five compensation programs must, out of space 
considerations, be necessarily brief For similar space reasons, it is not possible to discuss, in 
this Article, other earher federal compensation programs, such as the 1969 Black Lung 
Compensation Plan, 30 U.S.C. §901-944 (2006), or other federal programs diat pay 
disability benefits to mifitary veterans, law enforcement officers, and a variety of other 
groups. This Article does not discuss the swine flu vaccination program in 1976-1977. See 
R I C H A R D E . N E U S T A D T & H A R V E Y L . F I N E B E R G , T H E E P I D E M I C T H A T N E V E R W A S (1983). 
International compensation laws are also outside the scope of this Article. See, e.g., Rob 
Henson, Comment, Inoculated Against Recovery: A Comparative Analysis of Vaccine Injury 
Compensation in the United States and Great Britain, 15 T U L S A J . C O M P . & iNT'L L . 61 (2007) 
(discussing the vaccination compensation program of Great Britain). 
149. Radiation Exposure Compensation Act, Pub. L . No. 101-426, 104 Stat. 920 (1990) 
(codified as amended at 42 U.S .C. § 2210 note (2006) (Radiation Exposure Compensation)). 
150. The Department of Justice reports that, as of September 22, 2011, a total of 24,468 
claims for compensation have been approved, 9,492 have been denied, and 467 claims are 
currendy pending. CrviL Drv., U.S. D E P ' T O F J U S T I C E , R A D I A T I O N E X P O S U R E 
C O M P E N S A T I O N S Y S T E M : C L A I M S T O D A T E S U M M A R Y O F C L A I M S R E C E F V E D B Y 
09/22/2011 (2011), http://www.justice.gov/civil/omp/omi/Tre_SysClaimsToDate 
Sum.pdf A total of$l,620,884,889 has been paid out. M. 
151. 42 U.S.C. § 2210 note (Radiation Exposure Compensation § 2(a)(5)). 
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have borne for the nation as a whole."'52 As in the Vaccine Act , R E C A 
created a "Table" of eligible individuals who could collect compensation i f 
they could establish that diey suffered a specified illness within a specified 
t i m e f r a m e . P e t i t i o n e r s were required to submit documentation showing 
that they satisfied the ehgibihty criteria in the Act.'54 However, R E C A also 
contained a provision that "all reasonable doubt wid i regard to whether a 
claim meets the requirements of this Act shall be resolved in favor of the 
claimant."'55 
R E C A created a largely mquisitorial procedure for resolution of the 
radiation injury claims. The petition for compensation was filed with, and 
reviewed by, officials in the C i v i l Division of the Department of Justice.'56 
The claim was evaluated by a claims examiner, by an attorney, and then by 
the assistant director of the C iv i l Division, before a final decision was 
made.'57 Petitioners who were denied compensation could either file an 
appeal in court or refile their claim up to three times with the Department 
152. Id. § 2210 note (§ 2(b)). The U.S. Government Accountability Office explained in a 
report on the program: 
From 1945 dirough 1962, die United States conducted a series of aboveground 
atomic weapons tests as it buih up its Cold War nuclear arsenal. Around this same 
time period, the United States also conducted underground uranium-mining 
operations and related activities, which were critical to the production of die atomic 
weapons. Many people were exposed to radiation resulting from tiie nuclear weapons 
development and testing program, and such exposure is presumed to have produced 
an increased incidence of certain serious diseases, including various types of cancer. 
U.S. G O V ' T A C C O U N T A B I U T Y O F F I C E , GAO-07-1037R, R A D I A T I O N E X P O S U R E 
C O M P E N S A T I O N A C T : P R O G R A M S T A T U S 1 (2007) [hereinafter G A O R A D I A T I O N E X P O S U R E 
A C T R E P O R T ] . 
153. The Radiation Exposure Compensation Act (RECA) created three classes of 
individuals who were eligible for compensation. First, "unwitting participants" who resided 
in certain areas of Utah, Nevada, and Arizona, who had been exposed to radiation as a 
result of their proximity to above-ground nuclear testing and who developed specified 
diseases (including leukemia and a number of forms of cancer) within five years of their first 
exposure to the radiation, were entided to receive a one-time lump-sum payment of 
$50,000. 42 U.S.C. § 2210 note (Radiation Exposure Compensation § 4(a)(l)(B)(i)). Second, 
"onsite participants" in tiie testing program who developed the same specified diseases 
within five years of their first exposure to the radiation were entided to receive a lump 
payment of $75,000. Id § 2210 note (§ 4(a)(l)(B)(ii), (a)(2)(C)). Third, individuals who were 
employed for at least one year in uranium mining, milling, or transportation, or who were 
exposed to forty or more "working level months of radiation," and who subsequendy 
developed specified diseases (including lung and renal cancers, respiratory disease, or other 
chronic renal diseases) within the apphcable time period, were entided to receive a lump 
sum payment of $100,000. Id § 2210 note (§ 5(a)(1)). 
154. § 2210 note (§§ 4(a)(2)(C), 5(a)( l)(A)(ii)(I)-(II)). 
155. §2210 note (§ 6(b)(1)). 
156. Id 
157. G A O R A D I A T I O N E X P O S U R E A C T R E P O R T , jM/ira note 152, at 15. 
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of Justice to try to correct an alleged deficiency that was the basis for the 
denial of the claim.'58 R E C A allows petitioners to be represented by 
lawyers, who are authorized to charge a small contingency fee for successful 
claims. 
R E C A has been criticized on a number of grounds. The G A O 
expressed concern that claims were often being resolved outside of the 
RECA-mandated twelve-month period of time.'S" The G A O also noted 
that the program's efforts to assist potential petitioners with die apphcation 
process were uneven at best.'si Inadequate assistance was a particular 
concern in cases involving older people suffering from cancers or other 
serious health problems who needed substantial and compassionate 
assistance in providing the detailed information and compihng the 
documentation necessary to demonstrate ehgibihty for compensation. The 
program has also been criticized for its failure to "fully compensate" or 
"fuUy apologize" to injured persons,i62 and for its "'burdensome' 
procedures" and "'excessive regulatory hurdles."''63 Congress has taken 
158. Id. at 16. Petitioners could also refile if they beheved that they became ehgible for 
compensation as a result of regulatory changes adopted by the Department of Justice in 
1999 or because of an amendment to the Act in 2000. Id 
159. 42 U . S . C . §2210 note (Radiation Exposure Compensation §9); 28 C . F . R . 
§ 79.74(aHb) (2010). The percentage varies from under two percent to up to ten percent 
depending on the type of case. Id. § 79.74(b). 
160. According to the Government Accountabihty Office (GAO), only 89% of claims 
have been resolved within the required time period. U . S . G O V ' T A C C O U N T A B I U T Y O F T I C E , 
GAO-01-1043, R A D I A T I O N E X P O S U R E C O M P E N S A T I O N : A N A L Y S I S O F J U S T I C E ' S P R O G R A M 
A D M I N I S T R A T I O N 2 (2001) [hereinafter G A O R A D L ^ T I O N C O M P E N S A T I O N A N A L Y S I S ] . 
161. The G A O contacted eleven nongovernmental organizations involved in R E C A -
related activities, including radiation survivor groups and Native American assistance 
groups. Id at 22. O f the organizations, six of the eleven organizations beheved that the 
Radiation Exposure Compensation Program (RECP) "was of htde to no help in explaining 
the requirements for documentation to substantiate apphcant claims, but five beheved that 
R E C P was generally to very helpful." Id at 23. 
162. Jessica Barkas Threet, Testing tlie Bomb: Disparate Impacts on Indigenous Peoples in the 
American West, the Marshall Islands, and in Kazakhstan, 13 U . B A L T . J . E N V T L . L . 29, 50 (2005). 
163. A . C O S T A N D I N A T I T U S , B O M B S I N T H E B A C K Y A R D : A T O M I C T E S T I N G A N D 
A M E R I C A N POLITICS 149 (2d ed. 2001). The relatively low lump-sum payments given in the 
program 
did litde to assuage grief, placate anger, mete out justice, or restore a community's 
faith in Washington. As one reporter summarized the views of the downwinders, the 
money was "too httie, too late, and too grudgingly given to fiU the void left in their 
lives by the deaths of parents and children whose only sin was to be in the wrong 
place at the wrong time." 
Id. at 149 (citation omitted). 
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some action to address these concems.is* 
In 1942, President Franklin D R . 
directing the Secretary of W ^ ' t o T ^'^^^"^^^ ^ ^ e r 
mtemment of A m e r i c 2 i ci t izenTand r T ' " "^^^^ ^^ e^ 
M o r e d . a n l 2 0 , 0 0 0 J a p a n e s e - r e r a n s 7 ^ ? " ' ? ^ " ^ ^ ^ - ' ^ ^ were forced into these c^rr^r.. of whom were U.S citizen, 
i o - of liberty. e e o n o S ™ d 1 7 ' - f f e C t h e 
1988, Congress passed a Z o f suspected disloyalty In 
m m , a f d a - l e ^ T a T o ™ " " ' ^ ^ ^ ~ P ^ > ^ » t I f 
™™v,„g fantily members, who i^ ; i„ te™ H " f Japanese ancestry, „ r 
r t > p : „ ' e s " : S i ' ' ° " ' ^ ^ ^ ^ " " " " ' ° 
e s s e „ t , ^ ; T , u a ^ r ; , t progran, involyed an 
Attomey General, d , ro„gh the O f f t 5 „ J ™ ' ' ™ " ' ' J - ' i o e . The 
dtrected to ..idendfy and L a t e " S p o L l f ' ^ " 1 , ' ' ' ' " ™ ° - , was 
* to apply . o C X U r S r b ! 
^ " U.S.C. app. § I989b.4. 
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sent a letter f rom the President apologizing on behalf of the U .S . 
government for the internment actions. "^ 9 
Under the program, a petitioner fdes an apphcation for compensation 
with die Office of Redress Administration, which makes a determination as 
to the claimant's ehgibihty. '" If the petitioner was found inehgible, the 
petitioner could seek reconsideration from the AppeUate Section of the 
Department of Justice's CivU Rights Division, and then judicial review in 
the U .S . Court of Federal Claims.'? ' 
As with the Radiation Compensation Law, the Japanese-American 
intemment compensation law contained a "benefit of the doubt" provision 
mandating that compensation be awarded i f there was "an approximate 
balance of positive and negative evidence" with respect to a claimant's 
ehgibihty.'?2 Also simUar to the Radiation Compensation Law, the 
Japanese-American intemment compensation law provided substantial, but 
only partial, monetary compensation, together with an apology from the 
U.S . government for its actions. Another important, more intangible, 
objective of the Japanese-American internment compensation law was die 
educational purpose of informing the American people of the injustices 
involved in the intemment program. i?3 
169. See 50 U.S.C. app. § 1989 (offering Presidential pardons to persons who were 
recommended by the Attomey General). 
170. 50 U.S.C. app. § 1989b-4(a). In this program, 82,219 individuals were found to 
satisfy the requirements for compensation. Japanese Americans: Check for Compensation and 
Reparahons for the Evacuation, Relocation, and Intemment, N A T ' L ARCHmss, http://archives.gov/ 
research/japanese-americans/redress.html (last visited Sept. 24, 2011). The total amount of 
compensation paid was approximately $1.6 billion. Id It was initially estimated that about 
60,000 claims would be paid from the fund, and this underestimation was based upon the 
mistaken use of actuarial tables containing the hfe expectancies of Caucasian males. A L I C E 
Y A N G M U R R A Y , H I S T O R I C A L M E M O R I E S O F T H E J A P A N E S E A M E R I C A N I N T E R N M E N T A N D 
T H E S T R U G G L E F O R R E D R E S S 352 (2008). 
171. 50 U.S.C. app. § 1989b-4(h). The Act imposed no limitations on a claimant's 
abihty to be represented by, or to compensate, an attomey. 
172. Section 1989b-4(a)(3) provides: 
(3) Benefit of the doubt 
When, after consideration of aU evidence and relevant material for determining 
whether an individual is ehgible individual, there is an approximate balance of positive 
and negative evidence regarding the merits of an issue material to the determination of 
ehgibihty, the benefit of the doubt in resolving each such issue shall be given to such 
individual. 
50 U.S.C. app. § 1989b-4(a)(3). This provision was not included in the compensation law as 
onginally passed, but was added by an amendment in 1992. Civil Liberties Act 
Amendments of 1992, Pub. L. No. 102-371, § 4(a), 106 Stat. 1167, 1167. 
173. M I T C H E L L T . M A K I , H A R R Y H . L . K I T A N O & S. M E G A N B E R T H O L D , A C H I E V I N G 
T H E IMPOSSIBLE D R E A M : H o w J A P A N E S E A M E R I C A N S O B T A I N E D R E D R E S S 225 (1999) The 
advocates of the Act saw the pubhcity generated by its introduction and passage as having 
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The battle for the compensation fund was led on Capitol H i l l by 
Representatives Robert T . Matsui and Norman T . IVIineta, two well 
respected and influential men of Japanese-American ancestry who had 
both been in the camps as young children.'?* Also influential were two 
Japanese-American Senators, Dan Inouye and Spark Matsunaga, both of 
whom had been war heroes in Wor ld W a r I I . ' " The Japanese American 
Citizens League, and other community groups, also pressed for this 
legislation. "6 
One scholar has concluded that this compensation program was 
successful because it was cathartic for many Japanese-Americans, because 
it restored a measure of dignity lost through the internment, and because 
the government's apology and the symbolic reparations payment fostered 
long-overdue healing in the Japanese-American community.'?? Another 
scholar has described this compensation law, and others like it, as 
"primarily symbolic," bringing a sense of closure.'?8 
an important educationeil value. See, e.g., Robert L . Koenig, Intemment Bill Is Meant to "Admit, 
Redress Wrongs." S T . L O U I S P O S T - D I S P A T C H , May 1, 1988, at l A ; A National Apohgy, T I M E , 
Oct. 22, 1990, at 35 . Funding was also provided for a permanent museum exhibition in 
Washington, D . C , to tell the story of the intemment and the compensation law. Eric K . 
Yamamoto & Ashley Kaiao Obrey, Reframing Redress: A "Social Healing Through. Justice" 
Approach to United States-Native Hawaiian and Japan-Ainu Reconciliation Initiatives, 16 A S I A N A M . 
L . J . 5, 18(2009) . 
174. Koenig, Mjftra note 173. 
175. L E S U E T . H A T A M I Y A , R I G H T I N G A W R O N G : J A P A N E S E A M E R I C A N S A N D T H E 
P A S S A G E O F T H E C I V I L LIBERTIES A C T O F 1988 1 1 1 - 1 3 (1993). This book also contains a 
detailed history of the Act's passage. Id. at 1 1 1 - 2 8 . 
176. Id. at 1 1 3 - 1 6 . The different Japanese-American groups had different perspectives 
on the meaning of the intemment and on the appropriate redress for it. MURRAY, supra note 
170, at 3. The $ 2 0 , 0 0 0 amount reflected a pohtical compromise between those who were 
concemed that too low a figure would make the financial payment seem like a mere token 
amount, and those who thought too high a figure would make passing the compensation bill 
impossible. Id. at 353 . 
177. Eric K . Yamamoto, Racial Reparations: Japanese American Redress and AJHcan American 
Claims, 4 0 B . C . L . Rev. 477 , 4 7 7 - 7 8 (1998). Professor Yamamoto quoted one former 
internee who said that "although monetary payments 'could not begin to compensate . . . for 
his. . . lost freedom, property, livehhood, or the stigma of disloyalty,' the reparations 
demonstrated the sincerity of the government's apology." Id. at 5 1 8 (aheration in original) 
(quoting N I C H O L A S T A V U C H I S , M E A C U L P A : A S O C I O L O G Y O F A P O L O G Y A N D 
R E C O N C I U A T I O N 107 (1991)). 
178. G R E G R O B I N S O N , A T R A G E D Y O F D E M O C R A C Y : J A P A N E S E C O N F I N E M E N T I N 
N O R T H A M E R I C A 302 (2009). 
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C. The Smallpox Compensation Program 
President George W . Bush, concemed that the nation was vulnerable to 
a bioterrorism attack using the smaUpox vims, announced his plan for a 
o m o i r ' ^ B vaccination program on December 13, 
2002. ' " President Bush's vaccination plan did not initiaUy include any 
provision for compensating those injured by the vaccinations. A t the end of 
January 2003, the Secretary of H H S , T o m m y G . Thompson, promised 
that m Phase I of the plan 500,000 healdicare providers and other 
emergency responders would volunteer to be vaccinated within a month 
However, when that one-month mark was reached, only 4,200 people—less 
than one percent of die promised amount—had agreed to be vaccinated 'so 
A n important reason for such an abysmal start to the smallpox 
immumzauon program appeared to be the lack of a plan to create a safety 
net for those injured by the smaUpox vaccine, either by receiving it 
themselves or by coming into contact with someone who had recendy been 
vaccinated.'8. The Bush Administration had suggested that, even widiout a 
tederal compensaUon program, persons injured by die smallpox 
vaccinations could seek compensation through other avenues, but these 
other avenues for rehef were speculative at best.'82 Moreover, the 
J ^ i Malveaux, Bush Gets Smallpox Vaccine, C N N . C O M (Dec. 21, 2002 10-13 
PM), http://arch,ves.cnn.com/2002/US/12/21 /bush.smallpox/index.html 
onnf • Z '^°""°"y' Inoculatkn Phn Near Standstill, WASH. PoST Feb 24 
2003, at A6 (noting that the intent of the program was to initially inoculate 500,000 fronihne 
emergency response personnel, such as doctors, nurses, pohce officers, and firefighters who 
would volunteer to participate in the vaccination program). 
181. U.S. G O V ' T A C C O U N T A B I L I T Y O m c E , GAO-03-578, S M A L L P O X V A C C I N A T I O N -
I M P L E M E N T A T I O N O F N A T I O N A L P R O C R A M F A C E S C H A L L E N G E ; ^ 5 (2003). fe a d Z n T o 
a lack of an adequate compensation program, other factors that hkely contributed to the 
failure of the smallpox program include difficulties in getting tiie smallpox vaccine doses to 
the appropnate authonties, the speculative and uncertain nature of smallpox threat to 
Amenca, and overextended pubhc health and hospital resources. Michael Greenberger, The 
the Context of Pre-Event Vaccine Immunization Programs, 8 J . H E A L T H C A R E L . & PoL'y 7 8 (2005) 
182. Among the suggested possibiKties was seeking compensation under the Homeland 
Secunty Act of 2002, but this Act only provided compensation i f the injury was the rruS of 
negligent conduct. Since the real concem was with the inherent danlerousness oFthe 
vaccme, and not its neghgent administration, this provision afforded "httie likehhood" of ZZ7n ^ / 7 , ' ' " S - ' - ^ - " ° « e i81,at 17-18. Another possibility for recovery suggested 
by the Bush Admmistration was under state worker.' compensation laws, but thi was 
probjmatic for a number of reasons, including the fact that the inocuMons w^ e I 
personte? / 7 M Q f 1 ° ' "^'^^'^ ^ " ' " " ' " - ^ emergency Svate h t h f ! questionable suggested altemative was compensation undel 
L d would e T " " "^ TT' ^^ '^^ h^^-^ ' ^ " - - d smallpox injuries, and would never have included compensation for lost income or pain and suffering Id 
894-
ADMINISTRATIVE Uw REVIEW j-gg.^ 
healthcare providers who were to be vaccinated in Phase T of t h . 
« „.„es. and . h ? h e r 4 a Z L ' r n ^ : S a ; r : ' 
refused to participate in the program '85 A n n m C r . i , 
compensation issues were resolved '86 ^ ^ ^ "'^ liability 
fmllVIptrdTd'r P ™ ^ " " ' ^ " ^ ^ Administration luicuiy supported, and Conaress adooted in lafp onn'i 
of having come into contact with the emergency responders who had b l e l i 
D i L t s , t ^ r e d t ; r i r S ^ ^ ^ ^ 
available today. Susan L a r H e T r S ' ' ° ^ r " " ' * ^ "''^ ^^ ^ ^^ '"^  ^uman vaccine" 
hlsb0819.hbn; 1 Ltlcow etT^^j^^^note^r^^^^^^^ 
canies significant health risks). The C e m e J fo^  ^ " '"""P°" 
estimatedthatonepei^onoutofevenTlOOn . ^"^ Prevention has 
reaction, and that one t o Z peLons of^ ^ T ™ " ' ^ ' ^ ^ ™ 
would die as a result of it C T R S FOR 1^  n ' ^ * the smaUpox vaccine 
S H E E T 2 (2003) htn^7/t!! K f ^ " ^ ' ^ * P R E V E N T I O N , S M A L L P O X F A C T 
ovemew.pdf ^' '^"P-''"^-'''-^*-8-''^g-'/»'"allpox/vaccination/pdf/vaccine! 
(2003). PW^amits Ussonsfor Biopreparedness, 31 J . L . M E D . & E T H I C S 580, 583 
107-108(2005). * ~ ' ' ° - ' - « ' ^ ™ C A R E L . & P O L V 1 6 2 , 1 ; M 5 , 175„„. |05 
(20i,°6),. ™ P " ) (codified « U S . C , S23!^239h 
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vaccinated, such as hospital patients or family members of the emergency 
responder.'ss 
S E P P A , and its implementing H H S regulations, created a Smallpox 
Vaccine Injury Table containing a list of injuries and the specified interval 
for the first manifestation of those injuries.'89 Under S E P P A , the petitioner 
had the burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence that the 
Table requirements were satisfied. If this burden was satisfied, then a 
presumption was created that the smallpox vaccine caused the injury.'9° 
The burden then shifted to the Secretary of H H S to show that something 
other than the smallpox vaccine actually caused the injury.'9' If the injury 
suffered was not hsted on the Table, or occurred outside of the timeframe 
specified in the Table, then the petitioner had the burden of proving by a 
preponderance of the evidence that the vaccine in fact caused the injury.'^^ 
188. A total of sixty-three requests for compensation were filed under the Smallpox 
Compensation Program as of November 29, 2007. Some fifteen people had been 
determined to be ehgible for compensaUon, sixteen requests were denied because they were 
filed too late, twenty-one requests were denied because no supporting medical records had 
been submitted or the medical records submitted were insufficient to support the claim, and 
six other claims were denied for other reasons or withdrawn. These statistics were provided 
to this Author in response to a Freedom of Information Act request filed with the Smallpox 
Vaccine Program. Letter from Mona Finch, Freedom of Info. Officer, Dep't of Health & 
Human Servs. to Peter H . Meyers, Professor, The George Wash. Univ. Law Sch. (Nov. 29, 
2007) (on file with Author). 
189. 42C.F .R .§ 102.21(a) (2010). 
190. 42 U.S.C. § 239a(c) (2006). 
191. See id. 
192. 42 C.F.R. § 102.20(d). 
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For those persons w h o c o u l d estabHsh ent idement to compensaUon , 
S E P P A p r o v i d e d less t han total compensa t ion fo r the injur ies i ncu r red : 
• N o compensa t ion f o r p a i n a n d suffer ing was au thor ized i n the 
statute. 
•Lost i ncome c o u l d be recovered, but it w o u l d not be 100 percent o f 
the i n j u r e d person's lost i ncome , but o n ly a p rora ted amount. '93 
• N o lost i n c o m e w o u l d be p a i d i f the c la iman t missed f ive days o f 
w o r k o r less.'9* 
• A cap was p l a c e d o n lost i ncome that aUowed no m o r e t han 
$50,000 to be p a i d i n any year.'95 
•Although death benefits c o u l d be awarded unde r the statute, no 
more than $50,000 i n death benefits c o u l d be p a i d to the 
c la imant ' s beneficiar ies i n any year. 's^ 
S E P P A con ta ined several other provis ions that also raised substantial 
difficult ies f o r potent ia l peti t ioners. The statute o f l imi ta t ions r equ i r ed 
vaccine recipients to file the i r c l a i m v « t h i n one year o f the admin i s t r a t ion o f 
the smal lpox vaccine. 's? For persons w h o suffered in jur ies as a result o f 
contact w i t h the vacc ina ted i n d i v i d u a l , the statute o f l imi ta t ions was two 
years. The regulations exphci t ly p r o v i d e d that no j u d i c i a l rev iew was 
available f r o m a decis ion re fus ing to a w a r d compensation. '99 N o t ime 
l imi ta t ion was p laced o n the Secretary o f H H S f o r r u l i n g o n p e n d i n g 
applicat ions f o r compensation.20o 
The p roceed ing at H H S was pure ly inquis i to r ia l , a n d it was conduc t e d 
wi thout any active pa r t i c ipa t ion b y the peti t ioner . Moreover, the Secretary 
was au thor ized to consult w i t h med ica l experts i n m a k i n g determinat ions o f 
ehgibihty, wi thout o f f e r ing the pet i t ioner an oppor tun i ty to respond.^o' If 
the Secretary denied compensa t ion , the on l y recourse f o r the c l a iman t was 
to file a request f o r recons idera t ion w i t h i n sixty days.20iJ The request f o r 
193. If the injured petitioner had no dependents at the time that the injury occurred, the 
petitioner would receive 66.6% of his or her lost gross income, and if the petitioner did have 
dependents, then the petitioner could receive 75% of his or her lost income. Id. 
§ 102.81(a)(l)(iHii). 
194 U. § 102.81(c)(3). 
195. Id § 102.81(c)(1). 
196. Id § 102.82(d)(2)(i). 
197. Id § 102.42(c). 
198. Id § 102.42(d). 
199. /rf. § 102.92. 
200. The Secretary of H H S was directed to "make the decision in a timely manner," but 
there were no standards or timeframes elucidating what a "timely manner" meant Id 
§ 102.70(c). 
201. Id § 102.20(a). 
202. Id § 102.90(a). 
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reconsideration could not include or make reference to any additional 
mformation not included in the initial petition for compensation.203 A final 
decision was then made by the Associate Administrator and no further 
admmistrative review was allowed unless the President specifically directed 
otherwise; as noted above, no judicial review was authorized.204 H H S 
regulations allowed petitioners to be represented by a lawyer or a 
nonlawyer, but it d id not authorize for payment of attorneys' fees and 
costs. 205 
Not surprisingly, given the hmited compensation and the inhospitable 
procedures contained in S E P P A , the new law was unable to resuscitate the 
Smallpox Vaccination Program. SEPPA's compensation regime was 
simply too htde, too late.206 O n October 15, 2003, the Director of 
Smallpox Preparedness and Response at the Centers for Disease Control 
announced that the program was effectively over: "The fact is, it's 
ceased . . . not that anyone's issued an edict to say stop."207 In fact, over the 
entire life of the smaUpox vaccination program, fewer than 40,000 
emergency responders ever volunteered to be vaccinated, which was less 
than ten percent of the 500,000 people that H H S promised would be 
vaccmated within the first mondi of the program.208 In sum, the smaUpox 
vaccination program was a resounding faUure, and a major reason for that 
faUure was the perception that it lacked an adequate compensation plan to 
protect individuals who might be injured by the vaccination.209 
203. Id. 
204. Id § 102.90(c), ,92. 
205. M. § 102.44(a), (d). 
206. Greenberger, supra note 181, at 21. 
208. Smallpox Vaccination Program Status by State, C T R S . F O R DISEAS E C O N T R O L & 
O c r s r ^ O H ) ^''P-^^'^-^''^-S°^^""^'^*=^^P'"'=^'^«l/™allP°''/spvaccin.htm (last updated 
209. Greenberger, supra note 181 at 8; Gursky & Parikh, supra note 186, at 176. Gursky 
and Parikh concluded: ' 
Among the most regrettable "losses" [from the smallpox program] was a loss of trust 
a phenomenon that occurred across multiple levels. Hospitals, chnicians, professional 
organizations, labor unions, and potential vaccines expected that their sacrifices of 
time and the potential risk to self and others would be met with appropriate levels of 
legal protections. In f ac t . . . inadequate regimes of liability and compensation 
Tni.nZr^-^'^ on-attempts to vaccinate anywhere near the intended number of 
3UU,UU0 civihan emergency responders. 
Id. at 184. 
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D. The September 11th Compensation Program 
Congress passed the September 11th Vic t im Compensation Fund just 
eleven days after the attacks on the T w i n Towers in New York Ci ty and on 
the Pentagon outside of Washington, D . C , in 2001.210 The fund was 
estabhshed in part for compassionate reasons, to help those who were 
mjured or who had a famUy member die as part of the September 11th 
attacks.211 Congress also made clear, however, that the most important 
objective of the Act was "to protect the airline industry, die Wor ld Trade 
Center's owners and others from protracted, uncertain htigation "212 
Indeed, the very name of the omnibus legislation that created the 
September U t h Compensation Fund was the A i r Transportation Safety 
and System Stabihzation Act (ATSSSA).2i3 There also appear to have been 
other very important intangible objectives for the program, reflecting 
important but difficult to quantify societal values. As Kenneth R . Feinberg 
the September l l d i Compensation Fund's Administrator, wrote about die 
passage of the September 11th Compensation Fund: 
Lawmakers . . . also wanted to show the world tiiat, in the face of such an 
unprecedented attack, die American people would rally around the victims 
Like the MarshaU Plan that rescued Europe after Worid War II, die 9/11 
Fund was a demonstration of American resolve in die wake of tragedy. The 
Nation would stand as one.2l* 
T o be ehgible for compensation under the September 11th Fund the 
individual had to have been "present at the site" of one of the four airplane 
210. September 11th Victim Compensation Fund of 2011, Pub. L No 107-42 115 
Stat. 237 (2001) (codified as amended at 49 U.S.C. § 40101 note (2006) (Air Transportation 
!)alety and System Stabihzation)). 
^ ' ' : , S'"^^"/- ^^^^'^^^^ Prawing the Choue Between Cask and the Courthouse: Experiences with 
the'J/II Victim Compensation Fund, 42 L A W & Soc 'V R E V . 645, 649 (2008); see also Robert M 
Ackennan, Jh September Uth Victim Compensation Fund: An Effective Administrative Response to 
National Tragedy, 10 H A R V . N E G O T . L . R E V . 135, 159-60 (2005) (noting, however, that the 
Victim Compensation Fund must be seen as a component of a larger measure to protect die 
airhne industry). ^ 
A ,^ 7 ^ • ^ J ^ ^ ? " ' ' * ^ " " ' ' " g , 9/11 Fund: Once Was Enough, W A S H . P O S T , Sept. 11, 2008 at 
A l 7. The Act was initially conceived as an emergency response to the crisis in the airhne 
industry. The immediate problem was that "airhne carriers, initiaUy grounded for safety 
reasons, would stay on the ground indefinitely because their insurers would refuse to 
conbnue their coverage and capital markets would refuse to provide funds to the airhnes in 
the face of potentiaUy 'unlimited' habUity." Hadfield, supra note 211 at 649 
S imtn^ * T^! ' ^? • ^ Transportation Safety and System Stabihzation Act 
§ 101(1)). The Act took other steps to address the financial problems facing the airhnes 
11 th attacb to 11.5 biUion for each airplane. Hadfield, supra note 211, at 649 
214. Feinberg, supra note 212. 
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crashes and "physicaUy harmed" as a result of the crashes, or be the 
appropriate representative of such person.2i5 These ehgible persons had to 
make a choice of seeking compensation from the fund or fihng a civil smt 
for damages.216 This was an "either/or" choice, in contrast to the Vaccine 
Act's staggered requirement of going to the Court of Federal Claims first, 
then having the option of rejecting the decision issued by diat court and 
fihng a civil action in state or federal court. Once a petitioner decided to go 
into the September 11th Fund, the petitioner was bound by the final 
decision of the special master.2i7 
The Act estabhshed a special master, appointed by the Attorney 
General, who was given very broad authority to authorize and pay 
compensation in appropriate cases. A T S S S A provided few specifics as to 
how the special master, or the September 11th compensation program, 
would operate.2i8 For example, the Act did not set forth specific amounts 
of compensation to award to different petitioners for injury or death claims, 
although it did provide that payment should be made for both economic 
and noneconomic losses.2i9 Both types of injuries were broadly defined in 
the Act.220 
215. 49 U.S.C. § 40101 note (Air Transportation Safety and System Stabilization Act 
§405(c)(2)(AHB)). 
216. Id. § 40101 note (§ 405(c)(3)(B)(i)). 
217. See id. (noting that upon submission of a claim an applicant would waive the right to 
file a civil action). 
218. « . §40101 note (§404). 
219. Special Master Feinberg developed a grid of presumed economic loss for decedents 
based on lost earnings or economic opportunities, age, and other information. See K E N N E T H 
R . F E I N B E R G , F I N A L R E P O R T O F T H E S P E C L U . M A S T E R F O R T H E S E P T E M B E R 1 1TH V I C T I M 
C O M P E N S A T I O N F U N D O F 2001, V O L . 1, at 7 (2004). The program's regulations estabhshed 
a presumpdon of noneconomic losses for death at $250,000 plus $100,000 for any spouse 
and for each dependent. 28 C . F . R . § 104.44 (2010). Petitioners could seek to obtain more 
than the presumed amount by showing "extraordinary needs or circumstances" in their 
individual case. F E I N B E R G , supra, at 8. For September 11th survivors, die $250,000 
presumed noneconomic injuries could also be adjusted depending of the gravity of the 
injuries. 28 C . F . R . §§ 104.45-.46. 
220. Economic awards for physically injured victims consist primarily of "actual income 
or expenses incurred as a direct result of the injury and future lost income and costs caused 
by the future efiects of the injury." 49 U.S.C. § 40101 note (Air Transportation Safety and 
System Stabilization Act § 402(7)). The economic award also includes, in appropriate cases, 
"the value of household services the victim provided to the household." Id Compensable 
noneconomic losses were defined in very broad manner, to include: 
[Ljosses for physical and emotional pain, suffering, inconvenience, physical 
impairment, mental anguish, disfigurement, loss of enjoyment of hfe, loss of society 
and companionship, loss of consortium (other than loss of domestic services), hedonic 
damages, injury to reputation, and all other nonpecuniary losses of any kind or 
nature. 
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The Act required the special master to issue a final decision within 120 
days of the filing of the claim, and it provided for no administrative or 
judicial review of the special master's decisions. The special master was 
given extraordinary authority to fiU in the procedures and standards to be 
applied in the Act, and also very broad and unreviewable authority to 
process individual claims under the Act . One audior has described Special 
Master Feinberg as being "unilaterally responsible for fillmg in nearly every 
detail of the program."22i Among the important details that Special Master 
Feinberg created were a number of Tables showing presumptive amounts 
of compensation for each category of economic or noneconomic injury. In 
special circumstances individual petitioners could seek increases over the 
presumed Table amounts.222 
The September 11th program was designed to process claims in an 
informal, nonadversarial manner, with the special master playing a 
basically inquisitional role. The Final Report on the program states that all 
hearings involving either entidement or the amount of compensation to be 
awarded "were designed to be non-adversarial. "223 A n y testimony received 
at the hearing was required to be under oath, but there was no right of 
cross-examination.224 Fund oflicials worked with various federal 
government agencies in verifying and gathering necessary information to 
process a claim.225 Petitioners had the right to be represented by an 
attorney, and the Act had no restrictions on payment of attorney's fees.226 
One author has challenged the view that the September 11th Fund was 
nonadversarial, noting that since no government lawyer was present to 
/rf. §40101 note 402(9). 
221. Elizabeth Berkowitz, The Problematic Role of the Special Master: Undermining the Legitimacy 
of the September 11 th Victim Compensation Fund, 24 Y A L E L. & PoL'Y REV. 1, 2 (2006). 
222. &e F E I N B E R G , ^M/!ra note 219, at 8. 
223. Id. at 10. A total of 3,962 hearings were held for 3,629 claims, and the majority of 
hearings—3,044—were regarding the calculation of the award. U. at 18. The Air 
Transportation Safety and System Stabilization Act (ATSSSA) gives petitioners the right to 
have an attorney represent them and the right to present appropriate witnesses and 
documents at the hearing, including expert witnesses where appropriate. 49 U.S.C. § 40101 
note (Air Transportation Safety and System Stabihzation Act § 405(b)(4)); September 11th 
Victim Compensation Fund of 2001, 66 Fed. Reg. 66,274, 66,280 (Dec. 21, 2001) (interim 
final rule). Special Master Feinberg initiaUy indicated that hearings would generally not 
proceed for longer than two hours, but subsequendy clarified in the Final Rule that there 
were "no firm time hmit[s] for hearings." September 11th Victim Compensation Fund of 
2001, 67 Fed. Reg. 11,233, 11,244 (Mar. 13, 2002) (final rule). 
224. F E I N B E R G , supra note 219, at 10. 
225. See id. at 65-66 (noting that procedures were created to facihtate coordination with 
various government and private organizations). 
226. 49 U.S.C. § 40101 note (Air Transportation Safety and System Stabilization Act 
§ 405(b)(4)(A)). 
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protect the fond, the special master or his designated hearing officers were 
repeatedly put in the position of having to defend the fund against 
potentially fraudulent claims.227 O n a "significant number of occasions, 
victims and decision-makers [were] in an adversarial posture. "228 
The first objective of this compensation program was to capture a very 
substantial share of the potential petitioners and get them to file in the Fund 
rather than in civil court.229 After these claims were filed with the Fund, 
the Fund's objectives would then be to compensate ti^ie ehgible parties 
generously, prompdy, and fairly. Special Master Feinberg beheved that 
after the September 11th Fund had expired, "everybody wiU agree it was a 
successful program. "230 i t does appear that the compensation fund met its 
first objective very weU. Ninety-seven percent of diose ehgible to file claims 
in connection with the September 11th attacks filed with the Fund.23i Only 
ninty-sk individual civil claims were filed by persons who selected diat 
option instead of participation in the Fund.232 
The September 11th Fund awarded compensation for 5,560 claims.233 
The average award involving the death of the claimant was $2,082,035, 
and the average award in an injury case was $392,968,234 A l l but one of 
the ninety-six civil cases involving the September 11th attacks have now 
setded, for an average of approximately $5.3 miUion per claim.235 The 
227. Stephan Landsman, A Chance to be Heard: Thoughts About Schedules, Caps, and Collateral 
Source Deductions in the September llth Victim Compensation Fund, 53 D E P A U L L R E V 393 403 
(2003). 
228. Ii 
229. One author has noted that Special Master Feinberg "made urging victims to join 
the Fund one of his top priorities." Berkowitz, supra note 221, at 27. 
230. Kenneth R. Feinberg, Speech, Negotiating the September II Victim Compensation Fund of 
2001: Mass Tort Resolution Without Litigation, 19 W A S H . U . J .L . & P O L ' Y 21, 27-28 (2005). 
Special Master Feinberg continued: 
The recipe for success was pretty clear: make very generous payments; outreach to 
the famihes; keep going after them and corral them; let them know tiiat there are no 
tricks, and that nothing is hidden here. This is a transparent attempt by the 
American people to help. Offer due process considerations. Give everybody the 
opportunity to be heard. Make yourself available. Reach out to these people. It 
worked. 
Id at 27. 
231. Hadfield, supra note 211, at 650. 
232. In re September 11 Litigation, 600 F. Supp. 2d 549, 552 (S.D.N. Y. 2009) 
233. F E I N B E R G , supra note 219, at 98-99. The fund received a total of 7,403 claims. Id 
at 109. 
234 W. at 110. 
235. Mark Hamblett, 9/11 Mediator Wraps Up Wor/c; Only 3 Cases Left Unsettled, N . Y . L J . , 
Mar. 6, 2009, at 1; Cohn Moynihan, Timetable Is Set for the Only Civil Trial in a 9/11 Death 
N . Y . T I M E S , Oct. 21, 2010, at A32. The court-approved mediator for the civil cases 
reported to the court that settiements in the first ninty-three cases totaled approximately 
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court-approved mediator for the September l l t h civil actions concluded 
that it was impossible to completely answer the question of whether 
similarly sitaated claimants did better in the September 11th Fund or by 
fihng a civil suit.236 
Many commentators have concluded that the September l l t h Fund 
largely succeeded in providing compensation that was generous, prompt, 
and fair to the petitioners,237 as weU as providing vital assistance to the 
airline industry at a time of exceptional distress.238 Other commentators 
have been critical of the September l l t h Fund on a number of grounds, 
including the procedural fairness of the decisionmaking process, the 
arbitrary principles involved in determining individual awards, and the 
excessive discretion given to the special master with little accountabihty or 
oversight.239 In this Author's view the September l l t h program was very 
largely successful, and it was so because Special Master Feinberg used his 
$500 million, although the specific amount of each settlement was confidential. Report of 
the Mediator on the Mediation and Setdement Efforts of the Parties in the Cases Previously 
Docketed Under 21 M C 97 at 13, In re September 11 Litigation, No. 21 M C 101 (AKH) 
(S.D.N. Y . Mar. 3, 2009) [hereinafter Report of the Mediator]. 
236. One reason why it was difticult to compare the amounts of the awards from the 
September l l t h Fund and from the civil cases was that awards in the civil cases were 
generally subject to payment of substantial attorneys' fees and costs, while the September 
11th fund case awards generally did not involve substantial attorneys' fees and costs. Report 
of the Mediator, supra note 235, at 14-15. Moreover, as the mediator noted, compensation 
in the civil cases was generally provided a substantial number of years after the September 
11th Fund moneys were distributed, and the civil claimants had to bear the toll of prolonged 
and uncertain htigation as well as the delay in achieving some closure and financial security. 
Id. at 15. The mediator added that the "famihes of decedents with very high incomes 
probably achieved settiements that would have been unhkely achievable dirough the Fund 
because of the rules governing the Fund, including deductions for collateral sources of 
recovery such as hfe insurance policies." Id. 
237. James C . Harris, Why the September Uth Victim Compensation Fund Proves the Case for a 
New Zealand-Style Comprehensive Social Insurance Plan in the United States, 100 Nw. U . L . R E V . 
1367, 1372 (2006) (comparing the Victim Compensation Fund to the New Zealand Plan 
and noting that both plans fairly compensate victims with minimal bureaucratic delay); 
Robert L . Rabin, September II Through the Prism of Victim Compensation, 106 C O L U M . L . R E V . 
464, 478 (2006) (reviewing K E N N E T H R . F E I N B E R G , W H A T Is L I F E W O R T H ? : T H E 
U N P R E C E D E N T E D E F F O R T T O C O M P E N S A T E T H E V I C T I M S O F 9/11 (2005)) ("In fact, the 
resultant mix of presumptive scheduhng tempered by personal empathy and pecuniary 
adjustments at the margin was the touchstone to the success of the program."); Joe Wientge, 
Comment, Foreseeable Charge: The Need for Modification of the Foreseeability Standard in Cases 
Resulting From Terrorist Acts After September Uth, 74 U M K C L . R E V . 165, 195 (2005) (noting 
that the Fund "by most accounts awards a very just sum to participants"). 
238. Ackerman, supra note 211, at 159-60; Hadfield, supra note 211, at 649. 
239. Matthew DiUer, Tort and Social Welfare Principles in the Victim Compensation Fund, 53 
D E P A U L L . R E V . 719, 725-26, 753-60 (2003); see also Ackerman, supra note 211, at 138-39 
(cHscussing the funds two major shortcomings). 
20UJ '''•'«ommv.-^,VACcmImRrC0M,E^tj,„p,a;j»„ 333 
awards.™ ' " " S ' " '"'""•"'y g ^ ^ o u s compensadon 
£ 'The Comlenmasure, Injury CmnpenMlion hogram 
from anthrax a n Z h e r ' ^ j ^ ^ r ^ ^ r T ' ' ^ 
restrrced fta, S m a Z Ted K ^-n^ 
Dodd menrorabt n„L 4tT ''' r ° W » ' o p h e r 
i n d u s r ^ a n d a bagof coa, . „ e v e , y T ; t e H c a „ : - S ^ ' 
pa .ed„nOeee .£:?^^rrMi-£—^^^^^ 
N.Y. T I M E S , June 17 2010 1^7 , I ^ ^ - 4 « 
a^ed to administer a m u l t i m i l L d d L "o^^^^^^^ . ' P r ' ^ ^ - b - g was even 
Virginia Tech that were dispersed to T u " ' ^ ' ' ^ ^"nated to 
campus in 2007. Ian Urbina, " ! , / T a i r j ' ^ ; " / i " " " ^ " ' " " ^ incident on 
T I M E S , July 6, 2007, at A lO The IZtl^ Zu -^ " ^ " " ^ ""'^""^ ^ - Y . 
Special Master Feinberg virtuaUv t i l anH ' ^P^^"^ f - ' " giving 
compensation program aSd t h e : t a S c a t g r a r r L ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ' ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^'^^ 
So, as we look to the future is the hesr 7n " ' l ^ ^ Program, 
compensation program m a m'a;; l i s er 4^ ^^ ^^ ^^  t r a s T K e T ^ ^ F ^ t ' 
It, and get out of his way? ' ' ' ' ' ^ « n e t h Femberg to take care of 
S E R V . , R L 3 3 1 4 5 , P Y E M I C iNttOENz" D o M p ™ ^ ^ " ' • O ' ' >«"=«<0H 
W ™ n g *e „ of i „ „ „ „ „ „ , 3 2 (2005, 
ami,. " ' • ' • • " " ^ " ' * " » ' « ( » 5 ) , J d i « e d . , 4 2 U . S . C . S 5 2 « d - 6 d , o 6e 
8 3 4 ADMINISTRA TIVE LAW REVIEW [ 6 3 : 4 
Countermeasures bil l to a "must pass" military authorization biU.24* Under 
this Act, the Secretary of H H S is authorized to declare a public healdi 
emergency with respect to a naturaUy-occurring pandemic, a bioterronsm 
threat, or any other actual or potential pubhc heakh emergency.2*5 T o 
date, the Secretary has declared eight such pubhc health emergencies, and 
has issued sue subsequent amendments to these declarations.246 
Once the Secretary declares a pubhc health emergency, aU parties who 
participate in the manufacture, testing, development, or distribution of the 
specified countermeasures are protected by the habihty provisions of the 
Act.247 The Act requires that any person who beheves that he or she may 
have been seriously injured by one of the covered countermeasures must 
first bring a claim for compensation in the Countermeasures Injury 
Compensation Program before bringing a civil suit for damages.243 
Unfortunately, H H S refused to adopt procedural rules to decide cases 
brought under the Countermeasures Injury Compensation Program for 
almost five years after the law was passed. It was only in October of 2010 
that H H S issued an Interim Final Rule authorizing the administrative 
implementations of the compensation program .2« H H S had previously 
announced that it would not process the claims it has already received 
involving adverse reactions to die 2009-2010 H l N l swine flu vaccine or 
the odier covered countermeasures until die agency issued rules for 
244 &« 151 C O N G . R E C . 30,726 (2005) (statement of Sen. Hatch); Sheryl Gay Stolberg, 
Legal Shieldfm Vaccine Makers Is Inserted Into Military BUI, N . Y . T I M E S , Dec. 20, 2005, at A26. 
245. 42 U.S.C. § 247d-6d(b)(l) (2006). 
246. The Secretary of H H S has issued emergency declarations regarding: (1) Pandemic 
Influenza Countermeasures, on February 1, 2007; (2) Anthrax Countermeasures, on 
October 6, 2008; (3) Acute Radiation Syndrome Countermeasures, on October 17, 2008; (4) 
Smallpox Countermeasures, on October 17, 2008; (5) Pandemic Antiviral Countermeasures, 
on October 17, 2008; (6) Botulism Countermeasures, on October 17, 2008; (7) Pandemic 
Influenza Diagnostics, Personal Respiratory Protection Devices and Respiratory Support 
Devices Countermeasures, on December 22, 2008; and (8) the Pandemic Antiviral 
Peramivir Countermeasure, on October 22, 2009. Covered Countermeasures, H E A L T H R E S . & 
S E R V S . A D M I N . , http://www.hrsa.gov/gethealthcare/conditions/countermeasurescomp/ 
declarations.html (last visited Sept. 24, 2011) (hsting Federal Register notices of emergency 
declarations). The Secretary has amended the Pandemic Influenza Declaration five times 
and the Pandemic Antiviral Peramivir Countermeasure Declaration once. Id 
247. 42 U.S.C. § 247d-6d(a)(l), (b)(1). 
248. Id § 247d-6e(d)(l). 
249. Countermeasures Injury Compensation Program (CICP): Admimstrative 
Implementatior,, Interim Final Rule, 75 Fed. Reg. 63,656 (Oct. 15, 2010) (to be codified at 
42 C.F.R. pt 110). 
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adjudicating these cases. 25o H H S disclosed, in response to a Freedom of 
Information Act request filed by this Author, that 230 claims had been filed 
involving the H l N l swine flu vaccine, and that a few additional claims had 
been filed involving other countermeasures.^si 
In this program, petitioners can bring a claim for compensation in one of 
two ways. First, petitioners can meet dieir burden of showing that there 
was a preponderance of evidence establishing that the specified 
countermeasure probably caused the injury.252 i n the alternative, i f and 
when H H S pubhshes a Table of injuries with respect to any of the 
countermeasures, petitioners wiU then be entided to a presumption that the 
countermeasure caused any injury listed on the Table, i f it occurred within 
the time frame specified by the Table.253 
The legislation for this program clearly intended nonadversarial 
processing of claims for compensation, widi H H S officials making decisions 
after conducting nonpubhc investigations.254 Judicial review is expressly 
precluded. 255 The statute of limitations requires the claim to be filed within 
one year of the administration of the countermeasure that caused the 
injury,256 radier than one year from the onset of the first manifestation of 
the injury. Neither attorneys' fees nor costs are recoverable.257 The types 
of compensation available are very similar to those available through the 
Smallpox Compensation Program, with no compensation allowed for pain 
and suffering, and only partial, prorated amounts available for lost income, 
250. U.S. D E P ' T O F H E A L T H & H U M A N SERVS. , H E A L T H R E S . & S E R V S . A D M I N . , 
C O U N T E R M E A S U R E S INJURY C O M P E N S A T I O N P R O G R A M : P R O G R A M U P D A T E 7-8 (2010)^  
http://www.hhs.gOv/nvpo/nvac/meetings/pastmeetings/nvac2010hrsa2-4v2.ppt#7. 
251. H H S indicated that as of July 12, 2010, it had received 230 requests for benefits 
regarding the H l N l swine flu vaccine, 3 requests regarding the anthrax vaccine, and 1 
request each with respect to the smallpox vaccine, the Japanese encephaUtis vaccine 
Relenza (zanamivir), and Tamiflu (oseltamivir). Letter from Thomas Flavin, Freedom of 
Info. Officer, Dep't of Health & Human Servs., to Peter H . Meyers, Professor, The George 
Wash. Univ. Law Sch. July 21, 2010) (on file with Author). 
252. 42 U . S . C . §§ 239a(c)(2), 247d-6e(b)(4). There is language in the Act indicating that 
petitioners must satisfy their burden of proof by introducing "compelhng, rehable vahd 
medical and scientific evidence." Id. § 247d-6e(b)(4). This language does not appear to 
change the preponderant evidence requirement of the Act. 
253. Id § 247d-6e(b)(5)(A). 
254 Cf. id. § 247d-6e(b)(4) (giving the Secretary of H H S broad authority to promulgate 
regulations). 
255. Id § 247d-6e(b)(5)(C). 
256. /</. § 239a(d). 
257. Id § 247d-6e(b)(2); Countermeasures Injury Compensation Program, How to File and Deadline 
for Filing, H E A L T H R E S . & S E R V S . A D M I N . , http://www.hrsa.gov/gethealthcare/conditions/ 
countermeasurescomp/howtofile.html (last visited Sept. 24, 2011). 
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as weU as other apphcable caps and exclusions. 258 The Act allows all 
persons who have first exhausted dieir remedies in die compensadon 
program to then file a suit for civil damages against a manufacturer or 
other provider covered by the Act. The Act specifies, however, that habihty 
can only be found i f die covered person was guHty of "wiUful 
misconduct. "259 
The Act has been subjected to substantial criticism for the sweeping 
protections it affords industry and the restrictive provisions of the 
compensation program.26o However, these concerns did not appear to be a 
consequential factor during die H l N l swine flu pandemic in 2009-2010 
When supphes of die vaccine became widely available in December 2009 
most Amencans did not seek the vaccine for themselves or their famihes.' 
JheNm England Journal ofMedicin, pubhshed a comprehensive evaluation of 
why this occurred.261 The two principal reasons were safety concerns about 
the vaccine, including possible side effects, and die lack of concem about 
getting a senous case of swine flu i f unvaccinated.262 Qdier reasons were 
258 42 U . S . a §247d-6e(b)(2); see also rd. §§ 239c-.. One area in which the 
Countermeasures CompensaUon Program appears to be more generous than the Smallpox 
Compensation Program ,s that the death benefit diat a sumvor can receive in A e 
Countenneasures Compensation Program is not reduced depending on the amount 
259. Id § 247d-6d(d){l). 
260. See, e.g., George W. Conk, Will the Post 9/11 World be a Post-Tort World' 112 P E N N 
G o s t i n T B ' T'^ P ~ °f tlll^O. 
Gosnn & Benjamin E. Berkman, Pardemk Injlumza: Ethics, Law, and the Public's Health 59 
ADMIN. L. REV. 121, 135(2007). A report issued by Public Citizen c o m l m e d t L f ' 
f nst gave the compames immunity, but then went still fiirdier and stripped victims of 
meamngful recourse. In this regard, the biU was a drastic departure from precedent, 
shielding corporations from legal and financial accountabihty, but failing to replace 
tnem with a B-ovemmpnt 'i,,r-mn^t^ „.*„ui.-u _ • _ _ ° th^rr, uui laiimg to replace 
hem wrth a government surrogate or estabhsh a guaranteed source of funds to cover 
losses. ITie recipients of pandemic products, dieir famihes, and society at large would 
Secttive consequences of industry's gross neghgence, recUessness, 
decepuve claims, and failures to warn, among other egregious acts. 
P U B U C CmZEN, W I L L F U L M I S C O N D U C T : H O W BiLL F R I S T A N D T H E D R U G L O B B Y 
i S r ' t T ' ' ' ^IfT"^ ' ™ (2006). Some have argued that the b 3 
t ^ n ^ T r P^" ' Taylor, We're All in Thu Together: 
l l4?-l7t2007T"^ ' ^ ' ^ " " ^ " ^ C ' ^ - L- I ^ V . 
261 GiUian K . SteelFisher, Robert J . Blendon, Mark M . Bekheit & Keri LubeU The 
^Mic's Response to the 2009 HIMI Influenza Pandemu, 362 N E W E N G . J . M E D . e65(l) 2 0 1 ^ 
This study was based upon an evaluation of twenty national pubhc opinion polls Id. at 
e65(l). By mid-January of 2010, 40o/o percent of poUed parents had had their children 
vaccmated and 21% of poUed adults had received the vaccine. Id. at e65(5) 
262. Id at e65(3) to e65(4). ^ 
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also given for not vaccinating, but concern about the lack of a meaningful 
compensation program was never raised in the public debate about the 
H l N l program.263 
This is i n marked contrast to the earher smallpox vaccination program, 
where the lack of a meaningful compensation program for injured people 
was a major cause of its failure. The next section of this Article wiU explore 
possible reasons for this different result, and compare this compensation 
program with the other compensation programs chscussed. 
111. C O M P A R A T I V E E V A L U A T I O N O F T H E V A C C I N E C O M P E N S A T I O N 
P R O G R A M A N D O T H E R R E C E N T C O M P E N S A T I O N P R O G R A M S 
A comparative analysis and evaluation of the Vaccine Injury 
Compensation Program with other recent federal compensation programs 
reveals several important lessons. 
A. The Adequacy of a Compensation Program Is Sometimes Crucial 
and Sometimes Irrelevant 
The perceived adequacy or inadequacy of the compensation program 
regime can be essential to the viability of a mass vaccination or other 
governmental health program. One of the principle reasons that the 
Smallpox Vaccination Program for first responders collapsed was because 
of the inadequate safety net for those vaccinated and for those with whom 
they came i n contact, including patients and their own family members. 
Doctor groups, nurses associations, hospitals, and even state healdi agencies 
were urging nonparticipation in die Smallpox Program, i n part because of 
the inadequate injury compensation plan in an otherwise questionable 
program. Less than ten percent of the promised 500,000 first responders 
ever volunteered to receive the vaccine and become part of the program. 
The program was an abysmal failure, and the lack of an adequate 
compensation program played an important part in that result. 
The history of the Smallpox Program has important lessons for the 
Vaccine Injury Compensation Program and for other potential government 
health or bioterrorism programs that Congress may consider adopting in 
the future. The Vaccine Compensation Program must be sure to maintain 
the confidence of the American people as a meaningful compensation 
program, and future programs must give careful consideration to 
263. Id. at e65(4). Other significant reasons that people gave for not getting the vaccine 
included distrust that public health officials would provide correct information about vaccine 
safety, dislike of injections, a recommendation from a healdicare provider not to be 
vaccinated, and the expense of the vaccine. Id. 
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compensation provisions and procedures to ensure that they are adequate, 
and that they wiU be perceived to be adequate, by the effected groups. 
The September 11th Compensation Program is a good example of how 
a user-fnendly compensation program is essential to ensuring the success of 
the compensation plan. A l l persons injured in the September 11th attacks, 
or surviving famHy members, were required to make an irreversible 
decision up front about whether to file a civil action for damages, or file a 
petition in the compensation program and accept the damages awarded by 
the special master, with no chance for any review of the special master's 
decision. The fact diat virtually everyone (97%) went into the 
compensation program, as opposed to filing a civil action, made the 
program a success in terms of seeking nearly universal participation. This 
could only have happened because die special master adopted presumptive 
compensation amounts with the opportunity for petitioners to advocate in 
person for upward adjustments in appropriate cases, creating both 
reasonable expectations of the damages that likely would be awarded and 
the flexibility to modify the damage amounts in special circumstances. This 
combination of an inquisitorial procedure with a friendly face, the 
opportunity for petitioners to participate in the compensation 
determination, and the relatively generous awards resulted in the success of 
this program. 
There has also been one situation where the adequacy or inadequacy of 
a compensation program appears to have been irrelevant to the operation 
of the vaccination program. During die H l N l swine flu pandemic in 
2009-2010, the absence of a meaningful, operating compensation program 
was not a consequential factor in whether people decided to get the swine 
flu vaccine for themselves or their famihes. W h y did the lack of a 
meaningful compensation program play an important role in the failure of 
the smaUpox vaccination program, but die lack of a meaningful, operating 
compensation program turned out to be irrelevant to the H l N l swine flu 
vaccination program? 
There appear to be several reasons for this anomalous result. First, the 
lack of a meaningful smaUpox compensation program was a large concern 
for doctors, nurses, and other first responders because they knew of the 
dangerous potential of the smallpox vaccine. However, the lack of a 
meamngful compensation program was not a substantial concem for the 
general public widi respect to die swine flu vaccine because the issue for 
most people was whedier to get the vaccination for an iUness that they did 
not perceive as a particularly dangerous threat. People were thus not 
particularly concemed about the adequacy of the compensation program 
for a vaccine-related injury. 
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Second, there was a substantial time lag between the swine flu 
vaccination program i n 2009-2010 and the Countermeasures 
Compensation Program, which was passed by Congress in 2005. This 
four-year gap meant that the details of the compensation program were 
remote and obscure when the government began the swine flu program. 
This is in sharp contrast to the SmaUpox Compensation Program, where 
the inadequacies of the program were immediately apparent and were a 
large concern to the first responders who were being asked to take the 
smaUpox vaccination. 
Moreover, the target audiences for the smaUpox and swine flu vaccine 
programs were very different. The smaUpox vaccinations were intended for 
doctors, nurses, and other first responders, who were very sophisticated 
about the potential risks o f the vaccine and therefore very sensitive to the 
need for an adequate compensation program to protect themselves, their 
famihes, and their patients. The focus of the swine flu vaccinations was the 
general pubhc, and most people were not overly concerned about getting a 
serious case of die swine flu, so they did not focus on die adequacy of the 
compensation program. 
It could be argued, based upon the swine flu example, diat the details of 
the Vaccine Injury Compensation Program, and even whether the program 
IS operational at all, are not important to the general pubhc, and thus the 
success of vaccine immunization in the United States is not dependent on a 
petitioner-friendly injury compensation plan. However, this argument is 
nsky at best. Vaccinations remain controversial for many Americans, 
mcluding the parents of young chUdren, and any action that undermines 
the pubhc's confidence that the Vaccine Injury Compensation Program 
offers a safety net to those injured by the vaccines could substantiaUy impair 
the continued success of the immunization program in this country.264 
B. Inquisitorial/Adversarial Models of Adjudication 
A l l of the compensation programs discussed in this Article, with the 
exception of the Vaccine Program, were based upon a nonadversarial, 
mqmsitional model, in which the official who decides the case is primarily 
responsible for gadiering die necessary evidence. In aU of these programs, 
264. Whenever a childhood vaccination is given in this country, the Vaccine Act 
requires that the recipient receive a statement from the healthcare provider that includes 
information from the C D C on possible adverse reactions to the vaccmation and about the 
Vaccme Injury Compensation Program in case of a serious adverse event. 42 U S C 
§ 300aa-26. A pubhc loss of faith in this compensation program risks lower immunization 
rates and undercuts the government's interest in encouraging parents to vaccinate their 
children and themselves. 
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except for the September 11 th program, the final decision was made after a 
proceeding in which the person seeking compensation had no right to 
meaningful, active participation in the proceeding and no right to notice 
and a hearing on contested issues. The September l l t h program's 
essentially inquisitional procedure was made open and consumer-friendly in 
a number of ways. Only the Vaccine Compensation Program was created 
with a blend of inquisitorial and adversarial features in which counsel for 
the parties play important roles in conducting the htigation, which usually 
involves contested evidentiary hearings focusing on the testimony of expert 
witnesses. 
Why should these compensation programs have such different 
procedures for resolving claims? It may be that the legal and medical 
questions that the special masters have to decide in vaccine cases are more 
complex and thus require a more complex procedure than the eligibility 
issues presented in these other compensation programs. The task in those 
other programs is often more clerical: that of determining whether the 
submitted documentation supports ehgibihty in the program. There is 
certainly an important screening role to determine i f the apphcant does 
meet the criteria that Congress estabhshed, but the fuU-blown and 
expensive protections of a formal trial are generally not going to be 
necessary to resolve these cases, except perhaps i n exceptional situations. 
The inquisitional model might work well i n resolving the relatively simple 
question of whether a Vaccine Table injury has been estabhshed, but the 
much more complex causation-in-fact cases that now predominate in the 
vaccine compensation program benefit from using adversarial procedures, 
incluchng opposing counsels' abihty to bring in leading experts f rom 
numerous mechcal disciplines to testify in court. The adversarial model 
approach, in which petitioners get to actively participate in a hearing that is 
the basis for the resolution of the case, is also likely to appear fairer to the 
petitioners than a decision in which they did not participate that is issued 
after what wil l be perceived as a secret review of the case file. 
One important reason for the success of the September l l t h program 
was that the special master recognized that within the inquisitional 
structure created to decide cases, it was desirable to provide the opportunity 
for petitioners to advocate face-to-face with the decisionmaker, and thus to 
feel they were heard and had the opportunity to participate in the 
proceeding. It is far different, and far less satisfying to a petitioner, to 
merely file a request for compensation with supporting documentation and 
then wait for the d e c i s i o n . T h e r e are, of course, transactional costs of the 
265. A l l of the compensation programs allow attomeys to assist the persons petitioning 
for compensation, but only the Vaccine Act and the Radiation Exposure Compensation 
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petitioners' greater involvement in the proceeding, including a potentially 
substantial additional commitment of time, possible financial costs, as weU 
as the wear and tear of being involved in htigation. Despite these costs, 
petitioners generally seek and benefit from active participation in the 
proceeding. 
C. Industry Protection/Altruism 
Most of the compensation programs discussed in this Article were 
adopted primarily to protect industries that Congress considered too big or 
important to fail. This is certainly true for the Vaccine Injury 
Compensation Program, where Congress was responchng principaUy to the 
need to prevent vaccine manufacturers from leaving the United States' 
market because of concerns over tort hability. Similarly, the principal 
purpose behind the Smallpox Compensation Program was to make the 
vaccine manufacturers exempt from any legal hability, with the federal 
government taking over the manufacturers' hability under the Federal Tort 
Clauns Act.266 The September l l t h Compensation Fund was passed 
primarily to protect the viabihty of the airhne industry in a moment of 
severe crisis. Most recendy, the Countermeasures Injury Compensation 
Program was adopted in 2005, primarily to shield vaccine manufacturers 
and other industries with hability protection and to encourage them to 
participate in governmental programs responding to major health threats. 
The two exceptions are the Radiation Compensation Program and die 
Japanese-American internment compensation program, both of which 
appeared to be adopted for altruistic reasons to bring a measure of 
assistance and closure to die affected groups. Neither statute appeared 
motivated by a desire to protect any industry or commercial interests. 
When these two compensation programs were adopted in 1988 and 1990, 
there did not seem to be concerns about any industry liability problems.^e? 
Program have provisions relating to attorneys' fees. The Vaccine Act provides for the 
payment of attorneys' fees and costs separate from the compensation that the petitioners 
receive, and authorizes fees even if the petitioner is unsuccessful so long as the case was not 
frivolous and was brought in good faith. 42 U.S.C. § SOOaa-15(e). R E C A authorizes the 
attomey to charge up to 2% or up to 10% of the award received, depending of the type of 
case. See id. §2210 note (Radiation Exposure Compensation § 9(b)); 28 C.F.R. § 79.74 
(2010). 
266. See 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b) (2006) (stating habihty provisions under the Federal Tort 
Claims Act); 42 U.S.C. § 239-239h (hsting habihty provisions for Smallpox Compensation 
Program). 
267. Congress had immunized nuclear weapons contractors from suits for damages in 
1985. See H E N R Y CoHEN, CoNG. R E S E A R C H S E R V . , 95-717 A , F E D E R A L T O R T C L A I M S 
A C T ; C U R R E N T L E G I S L A T I O N A N D J U D I C I A L ISSUES 13-15 (2001). The federal govemment. 
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Instead, these compensation programs "fit with the national penchant for 
righting old wrongs, which seemed to pervade Washington during this 
period."268 
D. Types and Amounts of Compensation Awarded 
The nature of the compensation awarded, and the monetary and 
nonmonetary components of the award, vary substantiaUy among the 
different compensation programs. In cases where the petitioner has died, 
the Vaccine Program, as weU as the SmaUpox Compensation Program and 
the Countermeasures Program, award a statutorily determined amount of 
$250,000 to the famUy.269 N o specific death benefit was provided in the 
September l l t h Fund legislation; the average amount awarded in that 
program by the special master in a deadi case was $2,082,035,270 In both 
the Japanese-American internment program and the Radiation Program, 
the family was ehgible to receive the fuU amount of compensation that 
would have been awarded to the deceased.27i 
Two of the compensation programs, the Radiation Program and the 
Japanese-American intemment compensation program, provided 
"compensation" consisting of an official govemment apology and a hmited 
monetary award. In die Radiation Program, quahfied individuals received 
between $50,000 and $100,000; in the Japanese-American intemment 
compensation program, the monetary award was fixed at $20,000. The 
partial monetary awards in these two programs served very difierent 
purposes. The $20,000 award in the Japanese-American compensation 
internment program represented a meaningful, non-de minimis payment 
reinforcing the seriousness of the apology, which might have seemed hoUow 
if it was only words, unaccompanied by a respectful gesture of monetary 
payment. Acceptance of the compensation and the apology aUowed many 
Japanese-Americans to feel some measure of closure over their intemment. 
In contrast, the partial monetary payments made in the Radiation Program 
were intended to provide some funds to pay for medical care or related 
services for sick or injured individuals. Acceptance of these limited 
payments proved especially problematic for many persons with serious 
medical conditions, such as former atomic workers who had developed 
and not private companies, had been responsible for the Japanese-American intemment 
process. 
268. T I T U S , supra note 163, at 153. 
269. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 239e(a), 3796(a); id. § 247d-6e(b)(2); id. § 300aa-15(a)(2). 
270. F E I N B E R G , supra note 219, at 116. 
271. 50 U.S.C. app. § 1989b.4(a)(8) (2006); 42 U.S.C. § 2210 note (Radiation Exposure 
Compensation § 6(c)(4)). 
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cancer, where the provided compensation did not come close to covering 
their medical needs. 
The Vaccine Act's mandate in injury cases was to provide complete, not 
partial, compensation for present and future mechcal needs, including all 
necessary and appropriate future therapeutic and related care, with no caps 
or specific hmitations, plus additional money for pain and suffering (capped 
at $250,000), and lost income (with certain hmitations). Both the Smallpox 
Program and the Countermeasures Program have substantial hmitations 
and caps on the compensation awarded that make them much less 
petitioner-friendly programs than the Vaccine Compensation Program.272 
E. The Role of Judicial Review 
The three most recent compensation programs—the Smallpox Program, 
the September l l t h Compensation Fund, and the Countermeasures 
Program—do not allow judicial review of final decisions involving ehgibihty 
for compensation. The other three compensation programs do provide for 
judicial review, and the availability of judicial review has played a 
meaningful role in these programs. 
There have been many important decisions f rom the U . S . Court of 
Appeals for die Federal Circuit that have defined the parameters of the 
Vaccine Act, and instructed the special masters on what criteria to apply in 
deciding cases, as was discussed in detail above. The Japanese-American 
internment compensation program also aUowed juchcial review, and several 
appeals were filed in court f rom denials of compensation. Most of these 
cases focused on the requirement in the Act that the individual was either 
forced to enter a camp or was "otherwise deprived of liberty" by 
governmental action during that time period.273 The court decisions played 
an important role in determining when an individual was "deprived of 
liberty" within the meaning of the Act, and therefore entided to 
compensation.274 The Radiation Exposure Compensation Program also 
272. See supra notes 193-200, 255-258 and accompanying text. 
273. 50 U.S.C. app. § 1989b-7(2)(B)(i). 
274. There are eight reported appeals from denials of compensation in the Japanese-
American internment compensation program. Three appeals concluded that compensation 
was appropriate because the petitioners had shown that they satisfied the ehgibihty criteria: 
Ishida V. United States, 59 F.3d 1224, 1234 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (holding that petitioner bom to 
parents of Japanese ancestry during the intemment period is entitled to redress); Odow v. 
United States, 51 Fed. C l . 425, 433 (2001) (ruhng that federal curfews and travel restrictions 
preventing petitioner from returning to her home and hmiting how far she could travel were 
sufficient restrictions on her liberty to justify compensation); Sato v. United States, 33 Fed. C l . 
818, 822 (1995) (determining that children born after parents fled dieir home during the 
detention period, who were thereafter prohibited by law from returning home, were 
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authonzed j u d i c i a l review, and the Court o f Appeals helped define a 
number of the important provisions of the Act. 2 " Judicial review has thus 
played an important role in the three compensation programs that 
authonzed it. There have been a number of appdlate decisions in aU diree 
programs that have defined key ternis in diese statutes, sometimes reversing 
the demals of ehgibihty for compensation, and providing oversight of 
agency decision making. 
F. Future of the Compensation Program Model 
There has been substantial scholarly debate on the desirabUity of using 
the compensation program model to provide redress in mass tort situations 
Thirty years ago. Professor Richard J . Pierce, Jr . argued that the tort system 
had faded to encourage safety or reduce accident costs, and he proposed 
the creation of a large new federal compensation program that would be 
responsible for compensating victims of virtually aU accidents or safety-
related injuries in America.276 Other scholars have argued for the creation 
ol specific compensation programs, such as a pemianent federal 
compensaUon program for victims of domestic terrorist attacks. 2 " Others 
sufficiently deprived of liberty to justify compensation). Five cases affirmed the denial of 
compensation: Murakami v. United States, 398 F.3d 1342, 1353 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (refusing to 
grant relief to a petitioner, bom to parents ofjapanese ancestry under tiie Act, based on the 
? . ! f '""^^'^^ ^Y "'Sasiii V. United States, 225 F.3d 1343 
1349 (Fed. Cir. 2000) (stating that petitioner bom to parents ofjapanese ancestry after 
F 3H TJ'.^T^T^J^"^^^^^ " ' '8^"" ^"^^ States, 122 
F.3d 048, 1053-54 (Fed. Cir. 1997) (holding that petitioner ofjapanese ancestry was not 
ehgible for compensation where termination of his employment with a railroad was not due 
to govemment action); Sliibayama v. United States, 55 Fed. C l . 720, 745 (2002) (concluding that 
peudoner ofjapanese ancestry who was not a citizen or permanent resident during the 
internment penod is not ehgible for redress under the Act); Obadele v. United States 52 Fed 
Cl . 432, 442 (2002) (holding that Americans of African Jes t ry do not have a ^ h t to seek 
reparauons under the Act), cert, denied, 540 U.S. 876 (2003). 
275^ See, e.g., Sharp v. United States, 80 Fed. C l . 422,^429 (Fed. C l . 2008) (holding that 
R E C A payments and Department of Veterans Affiiirs benefits offset each other); HackweU 
9 n n « w T 0*-^v-00827-EWN, 2008 U.S. Dist. L E X I S 56641, at *23 (D. Colo. 
2008) (stating that limitations on payment of attomeys' fees do not include expenses incurred 
m the htigation); HoweU v. Reno, 939 F. Supp. 802, 807-^)9 (D. Colo. 1996) (mhng that 
R E C A can constitutionaUy distinguish between cigarette smokers and nonsmokers in 
aetermmmg ehgibihty for compensation). 
If ^^^^f ^ T ^ ' ^"""'"^'^ Safety: The Limits of Tort Law and Govemment Regulation, 33 V A N D . L . R E V . 1281, 1320 (1980). 
277. See Betsy J Grey, Homeland Security and Federal Relief- A Proposal for a Pemianent 
Compmsation System for Domsstu: Terrorist Fictims, 9 N . Y . U . J . L E G I S . & PuB. PoL'v 663, 749 
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have argued that the compensation program model should be abandoned 
m favor of reform of the tort laws.278 
The experience of the compensation programs adopted by Congress in 
recent years present a m k e d picture of success and failure. The SmaUpox 
Program for first responders failed in part because of its inadequate injury 
compensation plan. The Countermeasures Compensation Program was 
totaUy dysfunctional for almost five years, with no procedural rules in place 
to process cases. The September 1 Idi program is generaUy agreed to have 
been a successful compensation program that provided compensation 
qmckly, transparendy, and with relative generosity. The Vaccine 
Compensation Program does some things weU, but also continues to have 
serious problems. 
IV . PROPOSALS TO F L X THE VACCINE COMPENSATION PROGRAM 
The Vaccine Injury Compensation Program has succeeded very weU in 
accomphshing many of its objectives, particularly in providing exceUent 
habUity protection for the pharmaceutical industry that makes the vaccines, 
as weU as the doctors and odier healthcare providers who administer them' 
The interests of federal health officials have also been largely satisfied, as 
there has been a generaUy constant supply of vaccines avaUable to 'the 
pubhc, and a large percentage of the American pubhc receive the 
inoculations. 
However, Congress's other objectives of ensuring that the Compensation 
Program works "quickly, easUy, and with certainty and generosity" 279 have 
not been satisfied. This Article proposes a number of changes diat would 
aUow the Vaccme Act to much more effbctively fuUUl these important goals. 
A. Adopt a Legal Standard of ProofMore Generous to Petitioners 
The Vaccine Act currendy requires petitioners to prove their cases by 
the "more hkely than not" or "preponderance o f die evidence" standard.280 
There is substantial confusion and uncertainty in applying this standard 
today. Several recent Federal Circuit decisions, emphasizing Congress's 
compassionate intent in the statute, have held that "close caUs regarding 
causation" should be resolved in favor of petitioners,28i while other recent 
Federal Circuit cases have emphasized that traditional tort causation 
278. See Conk, supra note 260, at 257. 
279. H.R. R E P . N O . 99-908, pt. 1, at 3 (1986), reprintedin 1986 U.S .C.C A N 6344 6344 
280. 42 U.S.C. §300aa-13(a)(l) (2006). 
^ ' ^ ' ^ ' ^ ^^"'^ of Health & Human Servs., 569 F.3d 1367, 1378 (Fed. Cir 2009)-
Walther v. Sec'y of Health & Human Servs., 485 F.3d 1146, 1150 (Fed. Cir 2007)- Altheti 
V. Sec y of Health & Human Servs., 418 F.3d 1274, 1280 (Fed. Cir 2005) 
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standards should be strictly apphed in off-Table cases.282 This has created 
an unpredictable and confusing situation. Congress should act to clarify 
the burden of proof requirement central to the resolution of off-Table cases. 
In this Author's view, the Vaccine Act should be amended to allow 
petitioners the benefit of a more exphcidy relaxed standard of proof of 
causation, similar to the standard of proof adopted for petitioners in other 
recent American and international compensation laws, which give 
petitioners the "benefit of the doubt" in close cases.283 Several of the other 
recent federal compensation laws have adopted more relaxed standards of 
proof for petitioners. The Radiation Exposure Compensation Act provides 
that any "reasonable doubt with regard to whether a claim meets the 
requirements of this Act shall be resolved in favor of the claimant. "28* The 
Japanese-American internment compensation law contained a "benefit of 
the doubt" provision that mandated compensation i f there was "an 
approximate balance of positive and negative evidence" with respect to a 
claimant's ehgibihty. 285 Similarly, the Department of Veterans Affairs 
statute provides that an injured veteran is entided to the benefit of the 
doubt on whether the veteran is entided to disability compensation in a 
close case.286 There are also a number of international compensation 
programs that have adopted a more lenient standard for petitioners to 
satisfy. 287 This generous standard should be incorporated into the Vaccine 
282. Moberly v. Sec'y of Health & Human Servs., 592 F.3d 1315, 1322-23 (Fed. Cir. 
2010); De Bazan v. Sec'y of Health & Human Servs., 539 F.3d 1347, 1351 (Fed. Cir. 2008). 
283. A n excellent article advocating for a "benefit of the doubt" standard favoring 
petitioners in vaccine cases is Katherine E. Strong, Note, Provir^ Causation Under the Vaccine 
Injury Act: A New Approach for a New Day, 75 G E O . W A S H . L . R E V . 426 (2007). Adopting this 
standard would increase the payments made from the vaccine fund, but the fund has had a 
substantial surplus that should not make this a problem. See U.S. D E P ' T O F T H E T R E A S U R Y , 
V A C C I N E INJURY C O M P E N S A T I O N T R U S T F U N D 75X8175 at 5 (2011), 
ftp://ftp.pubhcdebt.treas.gov/dfi/tfmb/dfivi0811 .pdf 
284. 42 U.S.C. § 2210 note (Radiation Exposure Compensation § 6(b)(1)). 
285. 50 U.S.C. app. § 1989b-4(a)(3) (2006). 
286. 42 U.S.C. § 300aa-13(a)(l). 
287. For example, the Claims Resolution Tribunal for Dormant Accounts in 
Switzerland, which provides compensation for victims whose assets were deposited in Swiss 
banks and then lost during the reign of the Nazis, are only required to show that it is 
"plausible" that they are entitled to compensation. The C R T Rules of Procedure, Article 
17, as amended, provides that: "Each Claimant shaU demonstrate that it is plausible in hght 
of all the circumstances that he or she is entitled, in whole or in part, to the claimed 
Account." C L A I M S R E S O L U T I O N T R I B U N A L , R U L E S G O V E R N I N G T H E C L A I M S R E S O L U T I O N 
P R O C E S S (AS A M E N D E D ) 10 (2000). Similarly, the United Nations Compensation 
Commission, estabhshed to pay compensation for injuries suffered as a result of Iraq's 
invasion and occupation of Kuwait, required that a claim be supported by "appropriate 
evidence sufficient to demonstrate the circumstances and amount of the claimed loss," with 
a "lesser degree" of documentary evidence necessary "for smaller claims." Decision Taken 
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Act. It is justified by both the compassionate intent of Congress in adopting 
the Vaccine Injury Compensation Program, and the uncertainty and 
unknowns in the vaccine-injury area that often make it very difficult to 
show a causal relationship between a vaccination and a subsequent adverse 
event. 
B. Provide that All Provisions of the Vaccine Act Be Construed Liberally 
As noted above, there are unresolved questions about the underlying 
philosophy of the Vaccine Act. The Act is sometimes described as a 
generous compensation statute that should be liberaUy construed in favor of 
compensating injured parties, but it has also been described as a statute 
waiving sovereign immunity that is to be strictiy construed in favor of the 
government. There is language in the Federal Circuit's decisions 
supporting both points of view.^ss It would be desirable for Congress to 
resolve these inconsistent rulings. Congress should recognize that the 
compassionate intent behind the Act is best embodied in a generous 
apphcation of its terms that wiU aUow the Vaccine Compensation Program 
to operate with the "generosity" that Congress intended.289 
C. Amend and Expand the Statute of Limitations 
The current statute of hmitations provision contained in the Vaccine 
Act290 requires a person to fde a claim within three years of the first onset of 
the manifestation of an Ulness, or within two years after a death (and within 
four years of the first symptom that lead to the death). According to the 
Federal Circuit's Brice decision, i f the petition is filed late, the court has no 
jurisdiction to consider it, and there can be no equitable toUing of the 
statute to permit excusable failures to meet the statutory deadlines.^si 
Many petitioners have missed fihng deadlines for reasonable and potentially 
excusable reasons, such as in Brice, where the pro se petitioners were facing 
by the Governing Council of the United Nations Compensation Commission at the 27th 
Meeting, Sixth Session, held June 26, 1992, at 19, U . N . Doc. S/AC/.26/1992/10 June 26, 
1992). 
288. Compare Andreu v. Sec'y of Health & Human Servs., 569 F.3d 1367, 1378-80 (Fed. 
Cir. 2009) (holding that causation standards are to be liberally construed in generous 
compensation law), with Moberly v. Sec'y of Health & Human Servs., 592 F.3d 1315, 1322-
23 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (declaring that traditional tort standards should be strictly apphed in off-
Table cases). 
289. H . R . R E P . N O . 99-908, pt. 1, at 3 (1986), repnnted in 1986 U . S . C . C . A . N . 6344, 
6344. 
290. 42 U.S.C. § 300aa-16(a)(2)-(3). 
291. Brice v. Sec'y of Health & Human Servs., 240 F.3d 1367, 1367-68 (Fed. Cir.), cert, 
denied 534 U.S. 1040(2001). 
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delays m getting complete medical records to file along with the petidon 
while simultaneously trying to find an attomey to represem them 292 The 
statute should be amended to extend the time for fihng bodr injury and 
death cases. Three years is an unnecessarily short time limit to file a 
P t l ^ l T Z w ' ' ^^^ ™ S Committee on 
Chddhood Vaccmes recommended a six-year statute of limitations, and 
bills proposmg the six-year period have been introduced in Congress 293 A 
modification to six years, or even ten years, would reflect the "basic 
generous purpose of the Vaccine Act.294 i n addition, equitable tolling 
should be allowed, as determined by the courts, on a case-by-case basis 
Once a new statute of limitations has been adopted, the .special masters 
should also have die option of reconsidering old cases dismissed for late 
hlmg that would have met die new statute of limitations deadline. 
D. Fix Attomey Compensation Problems 
The payment of attomeys' fees and costs has generated considerable 
htigauon in die Vaccine Program. The statute should be amended to pay 
appropnate market rates for these complex vaccine injury cases,295 and 
make both interim and final fee payment procedures quicker, less 
adversanal and more predictable.296 The U . S . Court of Federal Claims 
cun-endy has a dedicated and experienced, but small, bar of petitioners' 
counseUnd it must support those attomeys with reasonable, prompdy paid 
tees. ITiis is also necessary to encourage other experienced attomeys to 
assist m these cases in the foture. The switch to predominandy off--Table 
cases m die Program has also resulted in cases diat are often much more 
complex both medically and legaUy, requiring substantially greater time 
and work, and imposing higher expert wimess fees and other costs that the 
court must pay prompdy and fully. 
292. W. at 1369. 
294. H . R . R E P . No . 99-908, pt. 1, at 3. 
295. The Federal Circuit has held that attorneys' fees are to be calculated using the rate 
1 [ ~ c t 2 0 ^ 1 ; ' - - « - s . , ^ 5 1 5 F.3d 
feef f n d tlZ ^ " ' ' ' ' ^ " " ' " ^ "^""^^ ^ " " ^ ^"^^""^ P^^^^^s of attorneys' deXtrb f r r ° ' " ^ ^ ^ ^ ° ^^''^^'^^ P - « - ^as yet beL 
M e l t a b l e IJnl .h ' ° " ^ " ^ P ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^"-ker and more Jert 1 ^; T""^ ' ° ' ^ ' ^ ^ y ° " administrative level, the attomey fee 
the o r o l r T r ^ ' ' ' " " c ^ (2006), could be amended to p r o S 
the prompt payment of mtenm fees according to a formula provided by Congress 
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E. Allow Parents to Suefor Their Own Injuries 
As currently drafted, the Vaccine Act allows only the party directly 
injured by the vaccine to bring a claim for compensation under the Act. 
As a resuh of this limitation, the Vaccine Act provides no protection for 
manufacturers or doctors being sued by family members of vaccine-injured 
persons for injuries recognized by state law, such as loss of companionship 
and loss of consortium.298 The Vaccine Act should be amended to aUow 
the parents of a minor child, or the spouse of an aduk, to be named as an 
additional party to the case, in order to seek compensation for their own 
pain and suffering, lost income, and expenses incurred. O f course, i f such a 
petitioner accepts the award in the vaccine case, the petitioner must forgo 
the possibihty of collecting an award in a separate civil action. 
F. Raise the Caps on Death Benefits and Pain and Suffering Benefits 
Under the Vaccine Act, as originally enacted in 1986, the payment for a 
vaccine-related death is a one-time lump sum payment of $250,000. 
Similarly, compensation for any pain and suffering that an injured 
petitioner may have experienced, and wiU hkely experience in the future, is 
capped at $250,000,299 Even assuming that $250,000 was appropriate 
when the law was first adopted, $250,000 in 1986 dollars is not the same as 
$250,000 in 2010 dollars. Accounting only for inflation, $250,000 in 1986 
dollars is equivalent to over $500,000 in 2011 doUars. 300 The awards in 
death cases should be raised to this amount, not only to reflect the actual 
value of the award in 2011 doUars, but also to better reflect the value of a 
human hfe, and to reach a result more consistent with the awards made in 
297. &e 42 U.S.C. §300aa-13(a)(l). 
298. Several decisions have held that the Vaccine Act only apphes to the person injured 
by the vaccination, and that family members are not precluded from bringing their own civil 
action for compensation for injuries such as loss of companionship and loss of consortium. 
Moss V. Merck & Co., 381 F.3d 501, 505 (5th Cir. 2004); Schafer v. A m . Cyanamid Co., 20 
F.3d 1, 5 (1st Cir. 1994); McDonald v. Lederle Labs., 775 A.2d 528, 535 (N.J. Super. Ct. 
App. Div. 2001). 
299. In fact, in this Author's experience, the statutory cap of 1250,000, as currently 
mterpreted by the special masters, means that the total amount assigned to pain and 
suffering can virtually never be $250,000, because any money allocated to future pain and 
suffering is reduced to present day value, but money allocated to past pain and sufFering is 
not increased to present day value. 
300. The U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics Inflation Calculator indicates that $250,000 in 
1986 had the same buying power that $516,754 has in 2011. See CPIInflation Calculator, U.S. 
B U R E A U O F L A B O R STATISTICS, http://data.bls.gov/cgi-bin/cpicalc.pl (last visited Sept. 24, 
2011). The Vaccine Compensation Program routinely uses Bureau of Labor Statistics 
calculations in computing final damage awards. 
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the September l l t h program. Similarly, the cap for pain and suffering 
should also be raised to $500,000, to reflect the value of the award in 2011 
dollars, and to more accurately reflect the value of the pain and suffering 
that many people with seriously injuries suffer for their entire lives. 
G. Allow Expenses for Guardianships and Conservatorships and Family Counseling 
Petitioners are sometimes required to set up court-ordered guardianships 
and conservatorships in state court as part of a vaccine case settlement. 
The expenses in setting up these proceedings have been considered 
reimbursable expenses to the petitioner in some cases, but not in other cases 
in the Vaccine Program. It would be fair and appropriate to compensate 
petitioners for these expenses in all cases, because they are incurred only as 
a result of court-mandated procedures in the vaccine case. Expenses for 
family counsehng services are generaUy not reimbursable to petitioners 
today. These services can be of critical importance to the injured person 
and their family members, and should also be reimbursable to petitioners. 
In addition to these suggestions for legislative action, there are important 
steps the Court of Federal Claims and the Government Accountabihty 
Office could take. 
H. The Court of Federal Claims Should Undertake a Comprehensive Review of the 
Vaccine Injury Compensation Program 
The U .S . Court of Federal Claims, perhaps under the leadership of the 
Chief Judge and the Chief Special Master, could convene meetings at 
which aU the applicable stakeholders, including attorneys f rom petitioners' 
bar, the Department of Justice, the Department of H H S , the special 
masters, and advocates for vaccine-injured individuals could discuss the 
operation of the compensation program and seek some consensus on 
measures that could be taken to improve it. The court does facilitate 
dialogue among the participants through Process Committee meetings, 
brown bag lunches, conferences, and other mechanisms. However, these 
mechanisms have proven insufficient to address the serious ongoing 
systemic problems with the Vaccine Compensation Program. 
/. The GAO Should Conduct Another Oversight Review of the Program 
The U . S . Government Accountabihty Ofiice has conducted a number of 
evaluations of the Vaccine Injury Compensation Program over the years, 
and it has documented a number of serious problems in the operation of 
the program, including delays in resolving cases, the overly adversarial 
nature of the cases, and problems with payment of attorneys' fees. The 
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G A O has a long history o f reviewing this compensation program, but it has 
been more than a decade since the G A O conducted a comprehensive 
review. It would be desirable for the G A O to investigate and report on the 
current operaUons of, and problems with, the Vaccine Compensation 
Program, as discussed in this Article. The flaws in the current operation of 
the Vaccme Injury Compensation Program should be investigated and 
C O N C L U S I O N 
The Vaccme Injury Compensation Program is no longer the quick 
mlomial , and less adversarial program that Congress intended it to be-^ 
and that it was in its early years, when the program focused on cases 
involving the law's innovative Vaccine Injury Table. The Vaccine 
Program has changed substantiaUy over the past two decades, with more 
complex, ume-consuming, and controversial off--Table cases predominating 
the court s docket today and for the foreseeable future. In light of these 
changes and the lessons learned from the five other major compensation 
programs that Congress has passed in the years since the adoption of the 
Vaccme Act, this Article argues for a number of statutory changes 
mcluding a lowered burden of proof for petitioners, so that the Vaccine Act 
petitioners 
^The Vaccine Act has succeeded in satisfying the interests of vaccine 
manufacturers the interests of doctors and other healthcare providers, and 
A e interests of the federal health agencies involved in the vaccine area 
However, the Act has not succeeded in satisfying the interests of the 
peUUoners. WhUe the Vaccine Program does a number of things weU it 
must be substantiaUy reformed to become much friendlier to petitioners i f it 
IS to fuimi the final key Congressional goal of insuring that the interests of 
those people who are injured by vaccines wiU receive compensation that is 
provided quickly, easily, and with certainty and generosity."«i 
^^301. See H . R . R E P . N O . 99-908, pt. 1, at 3 (1986), repnnted in 1986 U . S . C . C . A . N . 6344, 
